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COMMENTS
PERMITTING SALE OF INSURANCE By BANK HOLDING




The authors examine the history of the Bank Holding Company
Act and the 1970 Amendments, particularly as they relate to the
authorized nonbanking activity of insurance sales. After discuss-
ing present Federal Reserve Board attitudes toward bank holding
company applications to engage in insurance activities, the au-
thors identify inherent weakness in the Board's current policies
and suggest a revised framework for analysis of such application.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the economic debacle of 1929, banking legislation has
generally focused on ensuring bank stability. One method of ensur-
ing stability has been to restrict the nonbank activities in which
banks may engage either directly or through affiliation with a hold-
ing company.
One exception to this separation of banking from commerce is
the sale of insurance by bank holding company ("BHC") subsidiar-
ies. This practice has recently grown into "a huge commercial tug-
of-war between the bank holding company industry on one hand
and independent insurance agents and other insurance industry
groups on the other."' After tracing the development of BHC regula-
tion, this comment will examine that controversy. An analysis will
then be made of the manner in which the Federal Reserve Board
("Board") has applied statutory tests to determine whether a non-
banking activity is permissible. A major conceptual modification of
these tests will be suggested. Finally, recommendations are offered
for a resolution of the controversy over BHC sale of insurance.
1. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d
224, 231 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 544 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), modifying opinion withdrawn,
544 F.2d at xxv, petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.
1977).
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II. PRE-1956 BHC REGULATION
A. Historical Overview of Bank Regulation
Federal regulation of banks originated with the National Bank-
ing Act of 1863.2 National supervisory powers over the banking in-
dustry were later augmented through passage of the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913,1 Banking Act of 1933,1 anci the Banking Act of 1935.1
These various pieces of legislation were designed to protect the pub-
lic's deposits by preventing unsound bank practices which might
have resulted in bank failures.'
In particular, the banking legislation of the 1930's, which still
serves as the major source of contemporary bank regulation, was
based upon a Congressional determination that one of the primary
reasons for the general financial collapse during the 1930's was ex-
cessive competition in banking, which led to unsound banking prac-
tices.7 Consequently, one facet of Congressional.attempts to pro-
mote bank stability is manifested in statutory provisions designed
to minimize unhealthy competition.' These statutes impose re-
straints on competition by preserving markets for existing banks
and by reducing pressures on banks to generate income through
unwise investments necessitated by excessive rivalry.'
Another factor traditionally cited as having contributed to the
bank failures of the 1930's was bank involvement in the securities
industry. Congressional response to this and other allegedly un-
sound banking practices involved prohibitions of and restrictions on
specified activities" in order to separate banking from commerce.'
2. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18, 19, 28, 31
U.S.C.).
3. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 31 U.S.C.).
4. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18 U.S.C.).
5. Ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18 U.S.C.). For an
overview of the development of American banking see J. COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE
ECONOMY 59-69 (2d ed. 1967). See also AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE COMMERCIAL
BANKING INDUSTRY (1962); M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960 (1963); L. HILDERMAN, NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS: A STUDY OF THEIR
ORIGINS (1931); P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1963).
6. Leavitt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, in THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY 4
(R. Johnson ed. 1973).
7. COCHRAN, supra note 5, at 90.
8. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970) ("need" test for chartering new branches); 12 U.S.C.
§ 371a (1970) (prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits); 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1970)
(limiting maximum interest payable on time and savings deposits).
9. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 5.
10. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (limitation on acquisition of investment obligations);
12 U.S.C. § 51 (1970) (increased capital requirements); 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1970) (limitation on
aggregate indebtedness); 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1970) (limitation on operations through and
19781
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B. Growth of the BHC Form
From 1920 to 1930, the initial growth period of the holding
company form, the banking industry experienced a general move-
ment toward consolidation.' 2 This phenomenon enabled financially
weak banks to join a group system and thereby acquire access to
sources of funds readily available to holding companies on capital
markets."3 Inevitably, other banks joined holding companies to
maintain their competitive positions. 4
The financial difficulties of the early 1930's retarded holding
company growth: widespread bank failures caused many large
groups to suspend operations. 5 Thereafter, the remedial legislation
relations with affiliates); 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970) (severe restrictions on acting as an underwri-
ter of securities); 12 U.S.C. § 603 (1970) (restriction on banks purchasing stock in corporations
doing foreign business).
The primary limitation on and power source for national banks is contained in the
"incidental powers clause." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1970). That section provides in part
that an authorized national bank shall have power to "exercise by its board of directors or
duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking." This statutory language has been interpreted
by some as a broad grant of powers and by others as a restriction on the power of national
banks. J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 300 (1976). See also Huck, What is the Banking Business, 21
Bus. LAW. 537 (1966); J. KNOX, HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1900).
During the 1960's the Comptroller of the Currency promulgated numerous regulations
under which national banks were authorized to engage in seemingly "nonbank" activities.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.1 (1959), superseded by, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1972) (national banks
acting as travel agents) cited in Arnold Tours, Inc., v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 428 (1st Cir. 1972).
The courts subsequently invalidated many of the Comptroller's regulations. See, e.g., Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122
(1969); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972); M & M Leasing Corp. v.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 391 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
In Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967),
aff'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), the court struck down a Comptroller's ruling which
authorized banks to carry on the business of insurance agents when incidental to a banking
transaction. For a discussion of judicial invalidation of a similar regulation promulgated by
the Federal Reserve Board in the context of bank holding companies see Part VI infra. These
judicial constraints may have fostered the growth of the holding company form.
11. It should be noted that to the extent that a BHC and its subsidiaries, both bank and
nonbank, are viewed as a single entity and the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(1970), permits nonbanking subsidiaries to exist, the Bank Holding Company Act may be
inconsistent with the traditional regulatory concept of separation of banking from commerce.
See, e.g., Letter from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Counsel for
Investment Company Institute (March 8, 1974), reprinted in [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 96,202.
12. Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 60 GEO. L.J. 1225, 1228 n.9 (1972). See also G. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING
STRUCTURE 95 (1968); see generally 23 OKLA. L. REV. 73 (1970).
13. Chase, supra note 12, at 1228 n.9.
14. Id. This "snowballing effect" also may be attributed to the common practice of
circumventing restrictions on branching as well as the widely shared belief that Congress was
going to limit holding company growth through remedial legislation. Id.
15. Id. at 1229.
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foreseen by many bankers became a reality in 1933 with the enact-
ment of the Banking Act of 1933.1"
The Banking Act of 193311 did not restrict purchase of bank
stock. It merely required that BHCs desirous of acquiring voting
stock in member subsidiary banks obtain a voting permit from and
submit to scrutiny by the Board. This legislation, however, did not
restrict the growth of BHCs. Therefore, in 1938, President Roosevelt
sought legislation to regulate the unchecked growth of BHCs.' 1 Al-
though the need for such legislation was both pressing and clear,"9
Congressional efforts to enact regulatory statutes proved unsuccess-
ful for eighteen years. 0 The dangers of BHC involvement in non-
banking organizations were brought to Congress' attention as early
as 1947.1 Holding company involvement in nonbanking activity was
characterized as a threat to the "disinterested judgment necessary
to the sound extension of credit and the protection of the depositor's
money."" In 1950, this fear was articulated with a greater sense of
urgency.
Whenever a holding company thus controls both banks and
nonbanking businesses, it is apparent that the holding company's
nonbanking businesses may thereby occupy a preferred position
[over] that of their competitors in obtaining bank credit. It is
also apparent that in crucial times the holding company which
operates nonbanking businesses might be subjected to strong
temptation to cause the banks which it controls to make loans to
its nonbanking affiliates even though such loans may not at that
time be entirely justified in the light of current banking stan-
dards. In either situation the public interest becomes directly
involved. 3
Proponents of restrictive legislation also expressed concern over
potential conflicts of interest. 4 Furthermore, the fear was expressed
that banks would disclose a customer's confidential information to
16. Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162.
17. Id.
18. S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1938); Chase, supra note 12, at 1230, 1231
n.19.
19. S. REP. No. 300, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947).
20. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was the culmination of the period. Ch. 240,
70 Stat. 133 (1956), as amended by Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat: 1760 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 26, 31 U.S.C.).
21. See A Bill to Provide for Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hear-
ings on S. 829 Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947).
22. Id. at 33.
23. Bank Holding Bill: Hearings on S. 2318 Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Reserve
Matters of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
24. Hearings on S. 829, supra note 21, at 32-33.
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a nonbanking holding company affiliate, 5 giving this affiliate an
unfair competitive advantage.
With these concerns as a background, the bills introduced in
Congress prior to 1956 shared a common purpose: divorcing banking
from commerce through forced divestiture of BHC nonbanking in-
terests. 6 The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956" ("BHCA") was
designed to accomplish this objective.
III. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956
A. The Statute
A BHC was defined by the BHCA as any company28 which
owned or controlled twenty-five percent of the voting shares of two
or more banks."9 Companies owning or controlling one bank were
excluded. Numerous reasons were proffered to justify this omission.
First, the relatively small size of these organizations did not pose a
great threat of an undue concentration of economic resources. Sec-
ond, there was no evidence that holding companies consisting of one
bank manifested the evil tendencies of their larger cousins, the
multi-bank BHCs. Third, many small banks were owned by family
corporations with interests in local businesses other than banks.
Inclusion of such one-bank holding companies in the statutory defi-
nition would have required divestiture of either the bank or the
other business interests. In most situations, the only economically
feasible alternative would have been to sell the bank. This would
have resulted in decreased competition, since these small banks
most likely would have been acquired by multi-bank holding com-
panies.30
Under the BHCA, formation of a BHC without prior approval
by the Board was deemed unlawful.3 Subsidiary banks were prohib-
ited from lending to or investing in their parent holding companies
or fellow subsidiary banks.32 Criminal penalties were imposed for
25. E.g., id. at 33.
26. Id. at 18. See also S. 829, 80th Cong., lst Sess. § 2 (1947) (declaration of policy).
27. Ch. 240, §§ 1.12, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970).
28. Company was defined as "any corporation, business trust, association or similar
organization" but specifically excluded partnerships. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
ch. 240, § 2(b), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (current version at 12*U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1970)). Subse-
quently, partnerships and similar organizations were included. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760.
29. Ch. 240, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1970)).
30. See Chase, supra note 12, at 1232 & n.30, 1233 & n.31. See also S. REP. No. 1095,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Haywood, Structural and Competitive Objectives, in THE BANK
HOLDING COMPANY (R. Johnson ed. 1973).
31. Ch. 240, § 3(a), 70 Stat. 134 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1970)).
32. Ch. 240, § 6, 70 Stat. 137 (1956) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 9, July 1, 1966,
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willful violations of either the BHCA or any regulation or order
issued by the Board.3 Additionally, parties aggrieved by orders of
the Board were permitted to obtain judicial review of such orders
in the United States Courts of Appeals .
3
The most important of the features of the BHCA was its pros-
cription, with eight exceptions,35 of BHC acquisitions, control, or
retention of nonbanking concerns. 36 The exception under which in-
surance agency activity by a BHC subsidiary was permitted pro-
vided that:
(c) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply-
(6) to shares of any company all the activities of which are of a
financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the Board
after due notice and hearing, . . . by order has determined to be
so closely related to the business of banking or managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto and as to make
it unnecessary for the prohibitions of this section to apply in order
to carry out the purposes of this Act.3
This provision must be examined in light of the BHCA's legislative
history to understand its scope and effect.
B. Pertinent Legislative History
The general philosophy of the BHCA of 1956 was "that bank
holding companies ought to confine their activities to the manage-
ment and control of banks and that such activities should be con-
ducted in a manner consistent with the public interest. ' ' 3 With
regard to nonbanking activities, it was thought that "bank holding
companies ought not to manage and control nonbanking assets hav-
ing no close relationship to banking."3
William McChesney Martin, Jr., then Chairman of the Board
80 Stat. 240 (1966)). See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1970) (loans to or purchases of securities of
affiliates).
33. Ch. 240, § 8, 70 Stat. 138 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1847 (1970)). Criminal
enforcement of the act has been deemed exclusive, precluding the assertion of any rights in
civil actions. South Dakota v. National Bank, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 970 (1965).
34. Ch. 240, § 9, 70 Stat. 138 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970)).
35. Ch. 240, § 4(c)(1)-(8), 70 Stat. 135 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)
(1970)).
36. Ch. 240, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 135 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1970)).
37. Ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 137 (1956).
38. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2482.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, noted that the princi-
pal problems in the BHC field had arisen from two circumstances:
(1) The unrestricted ability of a bank holding company group
to add to the number of its banking units, making possible the
concentration of commercial bank facilities in a particular area
under a single control and management; and
(2) The combination under single control of both banking and
nonbanking enterprises, permitting departure from the principle
that banking institutions should not engage in business wholly
unrelated to banking.
40
Requiring prior Board approval of BHC formation or acquisi-
tions" was directed at solving the first problem. Requiring BHC
divestiture of nonbanking interests went to the second. 2 Generally,
the legislation r'epresented an attempt to regulate expansion of
BHCs and to require divestiture of their nonbanking interests.43 As
indicated above, several exceptions were made to the Act's divesti-
ture requirement." One such exception involved insurance agency
activities.
In discussing the exception under which nonbank subsidiaries
of BHCs might conduct insurance agency activities, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency reported that:
40. Id. at 2, [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at 2483.
41. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
43. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955), reprinted in [19561 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2482, 2485. It should be reiterated that when Congress enacted the BHCA
of 1956, it was aware of possible tying problems created through BHC involvement in non-
banking activities. The Senate Report on the bill indicated that:
The committee was informed of the danger to a bank within a bank holding
company controlling nonbanking assets, should the company unduly favor its
nonbanking operation by requiring the bank's customers to make use of such
nonbanking enterprises as a condition to doing business with the bank. The bill's
divestment provisions should prevent this fear from becoming a reality.
S. REP. No. 1095 at 5, [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 2486.°The House Committee
on Banking and Currency expressed similar sentiments.
If banks were permitted to own nonbanking businesses they would be compelled
in many instances to extend credit to such businesses to the detriment of other
competitive businesses in the community and possibly also to a degree which
would be unsound from a banking viewpoint. A bank should always be at arms'
length with its borrowers and such a position could not be maintained were banks
permitted to own nonbanking businesses and make credit available to them.
Through the bank holding company device these restraints which are placed on
banks generally are absent.
H. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1955).
44. In the words of the Senate Committee: "Appropriate exceptions are made in the bill
in order to enable bank holding companies to retain ownership and control of nonbanking
assets in cases where such retention will not violate the purposes of the bill." S. REP. No.
1095, supra note 38, at 2, [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2493.
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Exemption (6) has been included by the committee as a
necessary provision to enable the administering authority under
this bill to permit the retention by a bank holding company of
activities found to be closely related to banking. . . . For exam-
ple, the operation of a credit life-insurance program in connection
with bank loans is clearly within the scope of banking operations
as presently conducted. So is the operation of an insurance pro-
gram under which the insurance proceeds retire the outstanding
balance of the mortgage upon the death of the mortgagor in cases
where the bank holds the mortgage. However, there are many
other activities of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature
which cannot be determined to be closely related to banking
without a careful examination of the particular type of business
carried on under such activity. 5
This language suggests that the drafters of the BHCA envi-
sioned the closely related test to function in two ways. Certain activ-
ities, by their very nature, would be deemed, a priori, closely related
to the business of banking and, therefore, within the exemption.
Other activities might be deemed closely related, but would require
a careful factual examination before the exemption would become
available. Oddly enough, the committee seemed to suggest that the
scope of banking operations as then carried on would have some
bearing on the determination of whether a nonbanking activity was
closely related to the business of banking. Existing bank practices
should have had no bearing on such determinations since these
practices were the targets, not the standards, for the remedial legis-
lation. Despite this inconsistency in the legislative history, the
Board undertook the responsibility of administering the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956, beginning with the promulgation of Regu-
lation Y.
C. The Administrative Aftermath
1. REGULATION Y
The Board issued the original Regulation Y,41 pursuant to the
BHCA, in 1956.11 Section 5 of the regulation dealt with BHC inter-
ests in nonbanking organizations. It provided in pertinent part as
follows:
(b) Shares of financial, fiduciary, or insurance companies.
Any bank holding company which is of the opinion that a corn-
45. Id. at 13, [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2494 (emphasis added).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 222 (1956) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1977)).
47. 42 Fed. Res. Bull. 834-40 (1956).
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pany all the activities of which are of a financial, fiduciary, or
insurance nature is so closely related to the business of banking
or of managing or controlling banks, as conducted by such bank
holding company or its banking subsidiaries, as to be a proper
incident thereto and as to make it unnecessary for the prohibi-
tions of section 4 of the Act to apply in order to carry out the
purpogag of the Act, may requegt the Board for guch a determina.
tion pursuant to section 4(c)(6) of the Act.,,
The emphasized language in the regulation clearly contem-
plated that the Board would construe the BHCA on the basis of how
various banks conducted their business in a geographic market.
This approach permitted Board approval of an application to en-
gage in a proposed nonbanking activity in one part of the country
and disapproval of an identical application in another part of the
country.49
2. BOARD ORDERS: 1956-1970
In the fourteen years from the enactment of the BHCA of 1956
to the 1970 amendments 0 to that Act, the Board approved approxi-
mately ninety-two percent of all applications by BHCs to engage in
insurance activities, whether as agency or underwriter.5 In making
a determination of whether the statutory exemption was applicable,
the Board developed a three-step analysis. First, the Board exam-
ined the nature of the activity to determine whether it was of a
financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature. Second, the Board ques-
tioned whether the proposed activity had a sufficiently close rela-
tionship to the business of banking as conducted by such bank
48. 12 C.F.R. § 222.5(b) (1956), reprinted in 42 Fed. Res. Bull. 838 (1956) (emphasis
added).
49. See notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text.
50. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760.
51. The Board issued orders in approximately 25 applications, denying only two. The
authors were able to locate and examine the following Board orders: Citizens & Southern
Holding Co., 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 673 (1969); Otto Bremer Co., 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1969);
Denver U.S. Bancorporation, Inc., 54 Fed. ies. Bull. 233 (1968); Otto Bremer Co., 53 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1555 (1967); First Virginia Corp., 53 Fed. Res. Bull. 373 (1967); First Oklahoma
Bancorporation, Inc., 51 Fed. Res. Bull. 676 (1965); Otto Bremer Co., 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 1389
(1963); Virginia Commonwealth Corp., 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 934 (1963); Otto Bremer Co., 47
Fed. Res. Bull. 1039 (1961); Montana Shares, Inc., 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 767 (1961); St. Joseph
Agency, Inc., 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 290 (1961); Otto Bremer Co., 46 Fed. Res. Bull. 621 (1960);
Union Bond & Mortg. Co., 46 Fed. Res. Bull. 152 (1960); Wisconsin Bankshares Corp., 45
Fed. Res. Bull. 1136 (1959); First Virginia Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 1247(1959); Northwest
Bancorporation, 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 963 (1959); Bank Shares, Inc., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954
(1959); First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 932 (1959); Otto Bremer Co., 45 Fed. Res.
Bull. 892 (1959); General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260 (1958); Transamerica Corp.,
43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014 (1957).
[Vol. 32:543
SALE OF INSURANCE BY BANK SUBSIDIARIES
holding company or its banking subsidiaries. Finally, the Board had
to decide whether surrounding circumstances were such that the
proposed activity was a "proper incident" to the business of banking
(i.e. whether ownership of the nonbanking interests would be consis-
tent with the purposes of the Act). Each of these requirements will
be examined separately below.
a. Nature of the Activity
By definition, applications to engage in insurance agency activ-
ities satisfy the requirement that all the activities of the existing or
proposed nonbank BHC subsidiary were of a financial, fiduciary, or
insurance nature."2 On one occasion an applicant sought approval
to engage in other activities in addition to that of an insurance
agent. The Board granted the application on a conditional basis,
requiring termination of the applicant's other activities.53 Therefore,
in regard to applications to engage in insurance agency activities,
Board orders turned on the other two steps in the analysis: close
relationship and proper incident.
b. Close Relationship
The requisite nexus between the business of banking and finan-
cial, fiduciary, and insurance activities generally took three forms:
historical affiliation, qualitative integration, and quantitative inte-
gration.
Historically, many banks had been offering insurance agency
services through an unincorporated department of the bank."4
Where the Board found that the practice of operating insurance
agencies in connection with banks had occurred in a particular geo-
graphic area without objection from local bank supervisory authori-
ties, the Board accorded cumulative, but not conclusive, weight to
such area practice as supporting a finding that the requisite nexus
was present.5 The closeness of the relationship could be confirmed
by such long-settled area practice where banks and supervisory au-
thorities had come to view insurance services as part of a well-
rounded financial service" and a legitimate competitive device.5"
52. See, e.g., Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014 (1957).
53. See, e.g., Otto Bremer Co., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 892 (1959) (requiring termination of
lending and real estate activities).
54. See, e.g., Otto Bremer Co., 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 1389, 1390 (1963); Otto Bremer Co.,
47 Fed. Res. Bull. 1039, 1041 (1961); First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917, 929
(1959).
55. E.g., Otto Bremer Co., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 892, 895 (1959).
56. Id. at 899.
57. Id.
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Moreover, many bank customers had come to expect insurance as
part of bank services.5" The Board specifically found that enactment
of the BHCA did not diminish the weight to be afforded such area
practice.'"
Apart from area practice, the Board often found the requisite
close relationship where there was a high degree of physical, organi-
zational, and operational integration." The common indicia of such
integration were sharing of physical office space, employees and
operating procedures. This qualitative integration also was ac-
corded cumulative weight in supporting a finding that the requisite
nexus was present." Furthermore, the Board suggested that "such
physical and personnel relationships may be regarded as giving rise
to a presumption that the activities of the insurance agencies are
'related' or incidental to the business of the subsidiary banks.""2
Quantitative integration was the final factor examined in ascer-
taining whether the relationship to banking was sufficient. In this
regard, the Board was concerned with that portion of the insurance
agency activities that were directly related to bank transactions and
the extent to which the bank's business was dependent upon the
activities of the insurance agency. Analysis centered on the amount
of insurance written for: (a) borrowers on loan collateral; (b) borrow-
ers on something other than loan collateral; (c) bank customers
other than borrowers (e.g. depositors, safety deposit box holders,
trust department clients, etc.); and (d) nonbank customers (i.e. the
public at large)." The Board did not require that a majority or
substantial part of the insurance written be on collateral of borrow-
ers. 4 Rather, the Board merely required that there must have been
"some direct and significant connection between [an insurance
subsidiary's] activities and the business conducted by the related
subsidiary banks in order to justify a conclusion that the requisite
close relationship exists."6 As with historical affiliation and quali-
tative integration, quantitative integration was accorded cumula-
tive weight.
58. Northwest Bancorporation, 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 963, 968 (1959).
59. Id. at 969. But see notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
60. Otto Bremer Co., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 892, 895 (1959).
61. Id.
62. First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917,930 (1959).
63. See generally Otto Bremer Co., 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1969).
64. Bank Shares, Inc., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954, 957 (1959).
65.Id. See also Otto Bremer Co., 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 388, 393-95 (1969) (Board rejected
hearing examiner's recommendation that, since all of the insurance activities were not related
to bank transactions, application be denied).
66. First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917, 931 (1959).
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c. Proper Incident
If an activity was of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature
and had a sufficient nexus to the business of banking through one
of these three factors, the Board's inquiry then focused on whether
an activity was a "proper incident." Since the overwhelming num-
ber of applications easily satisfied the "nature of the activity" and
"close relationship" requirements, the real issue posed in applica-
tions by BHCs to perform insurance agency activities through non-
banking subsidiaries was whether these activities were a proper inci-
dent to the business of banking or of managing or controlling
banks. 7
With regard to a working definition of "proper incident," the
Board suggested that "[s]ection 4(c)(6) [was] intended to exempt
only those nonbanking businesses that 'usually' or 'naturally'
'depend upon' or 'appertain to' the business of banking or of manag-
ing or controlling banks." 8 In light of the broad language of this
working definition, the Board went on to qualify its remarks by
stating that:
If a nonbanking business is a "proper incident" to banking or to
managing or controlling banks, that is if it properly and
"naturally appertains" thereto, it is less likely to cause a bank
to be influenced by the "unnatural" or extraneous considerations
or temptations that are "potential sources of evil." Hence, it is
more likely to accord with the "purposes of the Act."
In other words, when Section 4(c)(6) refers to "proper inci-
dent" and to the "purposes of this Act" it uses the terms jointly
to limit the exemption in the section to situations which substan-
tially escape the "potential sources of evil" against which the
general prohibition was directed."5
The potential evils alluded to included, inter alia, the fear
"that a holding company, in extending credit, might exert pressure
on borrowers to do business with the lending bank's affiliated corpo-
rations rather than with their competitors, thus denying those bor-
rowers an appropriate freedom of choice." 0 One hearing examiner
found that this potential source of evil existed where an insurance
agency was operated in conjunction with bank lending activities.7'
67. General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260, 295 (1958) (hearing examiner's rec-
ommendation).
68. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1015 (1957). Note that section 4(c)(6)
was redesignated section 4(c)(8). Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 8(b), 80 Stat. 239.
69. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1016-17 (1957).
70. Id. at 1016. See generally notes 21-27 supra as well as accompanying text.
71. General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260, 295 (1958).
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The Board, however, did not pass upon this conclusion since the
applicant did not file the appropriate exceptions for Board review
and, therefore, was deemed to have abandoned any objections to the
hearing examiner's recommended decision.7" Additionally, the
Board broadened the section 4(c)(6) exemption by holding that only
evils "peculiar to" the operation of a bank holding company, as
distinguished from those evils occasioned by all banks whether or
not affiliated with a holding company, were the targets of the
BHCA.73 This posture virtually assured the approval of every bank
application to become a BHC through affiliation with a nonbank
insurance subsidiary, where such bank had offered insurance agency
services in a geographic area through an unincorporated depart-
ment. In other words, area practice presumably negated the exist-
ence of potential evils peculiar to BHCs, thereby rendering the pro-
posed activity a proper incident.7"
Giving such weight to area practice might have led to exemp-
tions in one part of the country and to denials elsewhere.75 Although
such results would have been consistent with Regulation y,76 there
was some question as to whether such a result was consistent with
the purposes of the BHCA.77 The Board felt that it was.7"
d. Factors & General Rules
The foregoing indicates that the Board asked the following
72. Id. at 262.
73. In particular, the Board said:
Section 4 was clearly not intended to remove all potential sources of evil in the
banking field; it was directed at those that may be said to arise from, or be
accentuated by, the operation of bank holding companies. Accordingly, it is im-
portant to determine whether a particular type of relationship is peculiar to banks
in holding company groups, or, on the other hand, is prevalent among both hold-
ing company and nonholding company banks. If the latter circumstance prevails,
it suggests that any 'potential evils' that may be inherent in the relationship are
not of the kind against which Section 4 of the Holding Company Act was directed.
First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917, 932 (1959).
74. Id.
75. Bank Shares, Inc., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954, 959 (1959).
76. Id.
77. General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Reg. Res. Bull. 260, 295-96 (1958). The applicant in
General Contract had argued that federal law should be applied uniformly in each state so
as not to require divestment in one state while allowing retention in another. The test offered
by the applicant was "whether a particular activity is a 'proper incident' to the business of
banking generally, and this should be based upon a uniform Federal policy, with the applica-
tion of State law left as a matter of State concern." Id. The hearing examiner's response,
which the Board never discussed, was that the proper standard to be applied was that
furnished by the statute, namely, whether the proposed activity might tend to influence
banks to pressure borrowers into doing business with affiliates. Id. at 296.
78. Bank Shares, Inc., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954, 959 (1959).
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questions in determining whether an activity was to be permitted
despite the prohibitions of section 4 of the BHCA: (1) Was there a
general practice in the area for banks to have a related insurance
agency? (2) Was this practice long-settled and without opposition
from local supervisory bank authorities? (3) Was the physical rela-
tionship of the agency to the bank such that the former would oper-
ate from the latter's quarters? (4) Were bank employees engaged in
the operation of the agency? (5) Were the operations of the agency
intimately related to the operation of the bank? (6) Was a substan-
tial part of the agency business done with bank customers? (7) Was
the relationship between insurance agencies and banks prevalent in
nonholding company banks as well as holding company banks?79
When the responses to all of these questions were affirmative,
applications were approved without exception. 0 Nevertheless, it
should be emphasized that the Board's analysis rarely consisted of
an independent examination of whether public benefits to be de-
rived from the proposed activity would outweigh adverse effects."
Although such a balancing test was not required by the BHCA, as
originally enacted, some hearing examiners did make recommenda-
tions based on such a test. For example, in First Virginia Corp.,"
the Board approved an application for the expansion of insurance
activity to include the issuing and underwriting of credit life, health
and accident insurance to borrowers of the applicant's banking affil-
iates. The Board adopted the hearing examiner's findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations in approving the applica-
tion.13 This order is of unique importance in that it involved the first
"public benefits" analysis by a hearing examiner."' Perhaps this
79. See Union Bond & Mortg. Co., 46 Fed. Res. Bull. 152, 156 (1960). See also Otto
Bremer Co., 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 1039, 1042 (1961). In Otto Bremer the hearing examiner stated
the general rule as follows:
Where there are close historical, physical, and personnel relationships between
the operations of a bank and of a connected insurance agency, and these relation-
ships are sanctioned or not disapproved by local governmental authority, and
where the arrangements have a wide acceptance in area practice, the insurance
activity may be a proper incident of banking, and ownership of the insurance
company's shares by a bank holding company appropriately exempted from the
prohibition requirement of Section 4.
Id.
80. See note 51 supra.
81. See, e.g., Virginia Commonwealth Corp., 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 934, 937 (1963) (writing
of insurance coverage would improve competitive position and facilitate operations); Otto
Bremer Co., 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 1039, 1041 (1961) (insulate bank from any liability arising out
of operation of agencies by reason of their close association with bank).
82. 53 Fed. Res. Bull. 373 (1967).
83. Id. at 374.
84. The conclusion reached by the hearing examiner, which demonstrates an apprecia-
tion of a "public benefits" test, read as follows:
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Board order, and subsequent orders"5 issued prior to the 1970
amendments to the BHCA, reflects a sensitivity to the growing Con-
gressional concern which ultimately led to the 1970 amendments to
the Bank Holding Company Act.8"
IV. 1970 BHCA AMENDMENTS
A. The Statute
The 1970 amendments to the BHCA were designed in large
part to expand the Act's coverage. 7 This objective was accom-
plished through definitional modifications. The definition of a
BHC 9 was enlarged so as to include those companies owning or
controlling only one bank. 9 Additionally, partnerships were in-
cluded within the definition of "company," 9 thereby subjecting
them to the prohibitions and restrictions of the BHCA for the first
time. The definition of "control" over a bank was expanded,9 fur-
ther broadening the definition of a BHC. Under the BHCA of 1956,
"control" was defined as ownership or control of twenty-five percent
of any class of a company's voting securities" or control over the
election of a majority of directors."' The amendments provided that
control also existed if "the Board determines. . . that the company
directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the man-
agement or policies of the bank or company.''"
[Wlhere as here, an applicant demonstrates that its nonbanking subsidiary
will have the experience and resources adequate to maintain a successful credit
insurance program and that it will be conducted in a manner consistent with the
fiduciary role of its affiliated banks, while, at the same time, providing a needed
service not otherwise available to the borrowing public, it is clear that the exemp-
tion should be allowed as in harmony with the purposes of the Act.
Id. at 379.
85. See Denver U.S. Bancorporation, Inc., 54 Fed. Res. Bull. 233, 240 (1968).
86. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760.
87. Comment, Implementation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970:
The Scope of Banking Activities, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1170, 1176 (1973).
88. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
89. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a)(1), 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A) (1970).
93. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a)(2), 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(B) (1970).
94. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1760 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841
(a)(2)(C) (1970). However, Congress also fashioned an irrebutable presumption that any
company holding power to vote less than five percent of any class of voting securities does
not have control of the bank. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1761 (1970), codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(3) (1970).
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Congress also saw fit to carve out certain exemptions from the
Act's coverage. Certain one-bank holding companies were ex-
cluded" while others found exemptions under a "grandfather"
clause."
Perhaps the two most significant amendments involved permis-
sible nonbanking activities 7 and prohibitions of tie-ins."
1. PERMISSIBLE NONBANKING ACTIVITIES
The original BHCA allowed BHCs to engage in activities "of a
financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature" deemed so "closely related
to the business of banking" as to be a "proper incident" thereto."
The 1970 amendments changed the language of this exemption and
the activities permissible thereunder. The amended language reads
as follows:
(c) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to
(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board
after due notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by
order or regulation) to be so closely related to banking or manag-
ing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. In
determining whether a particular activity'is a proper incident to
banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall con-
sider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding com-
pany can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the pub-
lic, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains
in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interests or unsound banking practices. In orders
and regulations under this subsection, the Board may differen-
tiate between activities commenced de novo and activities
95. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(d), Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(7), 84 Stat.
1766 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1970). For a discussion of the reasons underlying
these exemptions see S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5527-30; CONFERENCE REPORT No. 91-1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3573-76.
96. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(1), 84 Stat.
1763 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970). For a discussion of the reasons underly-
ing the grandfather privileges see S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), re-
printed in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5522-24; CONFERENCE REPORT No. 91-1747,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5577-79.
97. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(c)(8), Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(4), 84 Stat.
1764-65 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
98. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 106, 84 Stat. 1766 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. 8§ 1971-78
(1970).
99. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 137 (1956). See also
text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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commenced by the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going
concern .... 10
2. ANTI-TYING PROVISIONS
Another major amendment of the BHCA dealt with tying
arrangements involving banks. The anti-tying provisions read as
follows:
A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell
property of any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the
consideration for any of the foregoing, on the condition or require-
ment -
(1) that the customer shall obtain some addi-
tional credit, property, or service from such bank other
than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(2) that the customer shall obtain some addi-
tional credit, property, or service from a bank holding
company of such bank, or from any other subsidiary of
such bank holding company;
(3) that the customer provide some additional
credit, property, or service to such bank, other than
those related to and usually provided in connection with
a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(4) that the customer provide some additional
credit, property, or service to a bank holding company
of such bank, or to any other subsidiary of such bank
holding company; or
(5) that the customer shall not obtain some other
credit, property, or service from a competitor of such
bank, a bank holding company of such bank, or any
subsidiary of such bank holding company, other than a
condition or requirement that such bank shall reason-
ably impose in a credit transaction to assure the sound-
ness of the credit.
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to
the foregoing prohibitions as it considers will not be contrary to
the purposes of this chapter. "'
100. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(4), 84 Stat. 1764-65 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(c)(8) (1970).
101. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 106(b), 84 Stat. 1766-67 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1972
(1970).
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B. The Legislative History
1. INCLUSION OF ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
As indicated previously,'"2 Congress had consciously chosen to
exclude from the original Act's coverage holding companies which
owned or controlled only one bank.'03 "Beginning in late 1967, how-
ever, a great number of the banks with assets in excess of $1 billion
[became] affiliated with nonregulated one-bank holding compa-
nies."'"4 This growth was perceived as a tendency toward carteliza-
tion of the economy and as a threat to the longstanding policy of
separating banking from commerce.' 5 Consequently, it was deemed
necessary to bring these one-bank holding companies within the
BHCA to guard against possible future abuses.' 0
2. CONTROL PROVISION
The expanded definition of control reflected a Congressional
awareness that the affairs of a company may be controlled without
owning twenty-five percent or more of its outstanding voting
stock.' 7 On the other hand, Congress also perceived that ownership
of less than five percent could never constitute a controlling posi-
tion.
3. ANTI-TYING PROVISION
Many, if not all, of the provisions of the BHCA are addressed
to the problem of misuse of economic power. In particular, banks
possess economic power capable of being employed in undesirable
ways: the use of economic power could lead to a lessening of compe-
tition or unfair competitive practices."'0 The anti-tying provisions of
the BHCA were intended to prevent such abuses of economic
power."10 The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reported
102. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
103. Congress made this decision twice, in 1966 as well as 1956. See S. REP. No. 91-1084,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5520-21
(hereinafter referred to as S. REP. No. 91-1084).
104. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5521.
105. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5522.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws at 5524.
108. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5525. See also notes
91-94 supra and accompanying text.
109. Id. at 16, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5535.
110. Id. Congress was also aware that such misuse of power was possible regardless of
whether the bank is affiliated with a holding company or not. Id. This is contrary to some
positions taken by the Board in passing on applications to engage in nonbanking activities.
See note 73 supra.
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that "[tihe purpose of this provision is to prohibit anti-competitive
practices which require bank customers to accept or provide some
other service or product or refrain from dealing with other parties
in order to obtain the bank product or service they desire.'
' HI
It should be emphasized, however, that the anti-tying provi-
sions of the BHCA are only effective in dealing with overt, coercive
tying efforts by BHCs. As will be discussed at length below,"' there
is another more subtle form of tying which this provision is unable
to combat and which may exist uniquely in credit transactions.
4. PERMISSIBLE NONBANKING ACTIVITIES
The underlying purpose and effect of the 1970 amendments to
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) have been the subject of much debate. One
group maintains that the amendments were designed to retain the
traditional separation of banking and commerce through more re-
strictive legislation."' The other group claims that the legislation
was designed to broaden the range of activities in which BHCs could
engage."4 The opponents differ as to the purpose and effect of the
two statutory tests"5 contained in the current version of the BHCA.
The particular views of the opposing parties are presented below.
a. Restrictive View
The restrictive forces were led by Wright Patman, Chairman of
the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Chairman Patman
maintained that the House-Senate conferees' decision to accept the
"closely related" test and reject the "functionally related""' test,
advanced by advocates of an expansive approach, supports the in-
surance industry position that Congress did not intend to expand
or liberalize the Act. The insertion of the "public benefits" test was
viewed as establishing a more stringent standard than the 1956
Act."7 Finally, Chairman Patman contended that the amendments
required a "direct connection" between a proposed activity and an
II. Id.
112. See text accompanying notes 306-26 infra.
113. See Chase, supra note 12, at 1238.
114. Id.
115. Those tests, the "closely related" test and "public benefits" test are discussed
hereafter. See Part VI infra.
116. Both the House and Senate had initially adopted versions of a bill to amend the
BHCA which would have provided an exemption for activities "functionally related" to
banking, such that their performance by a bank holding company affiliate reasonably could
be expected to produce benefits to the public that would outweigh possible adverse effects,
See S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).
117. See 116 CONG. REc. 41,950-51 (1970).
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activity banks were already authorized to perform." ' Inclusion of
insurance activities on the "laundry list" in the House bill"9 was
additional evidence of the intent of the majority of the House con-
ferees to limit permissible nonbanking activities.
b. Expansive View
The Senate conferees and a minority of the House conferees
interpreted the language of the amendments as broadening the
range of activities in which a BHC could engage. The following
remarks by senatorial participants in the enactment of the BIICA
amendments are indicative of the positions taken by the expansive
forces. a
[The bill] frees the Board of the restrictive precedents es-
tablished under the present act. . . .Furthermore, it defines "a
proper incident" to banking in very broad terms of various bene-
fits to the public as opposed to possible adverse effects.' 0
The House managers' statement regarding the meaning of
section 4(c)(8) is in my opinion a misconstruction of fact. It is
hard for me to conceive of any way that an objective person
present at the conference could interpret section 4(c)(8) as was
done in that statement.'"
[Section 4(c)(8) as amended] retains [from the original
Senate bill] maximum flexibility for the Federal Reserve Board
to determine the activities in which a bank holding company and
its subsidiaries may engage. .... "I
In sum, the proponents of a liberal and expansive application
of the BHCA felt that:
the Amendments would free the Board of the restrictions of the
1956 Act and would allow activities to be related to the business
of banking generally, rather than perpetuate the concept that
such activities must be related to the specific business carried on
by the subsidiary banks of the particular holding company in-
volved.'1
3
118. H. R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
119. The "laundry list" contained those activities in which BHCs were prohibited
from engaging. In addition to insurance agency activities, BHCs and their subsidiaries would
have been prohibited from engaging in the business of maintaining travel agencies; providing
auditing or other professional services in the field of accounting; providing data processing
services, except as incident to banking services; leasing property; and selling mutual funds.
See 115 CoNG. REc. 33,133-34 (1969). This "laundry list" was rejected in conference and did
not appear in the final version of the amendments enacted into law.
120. 116 CONG. REc. 42,422-24 (1970).
121. 116 CoNG. REC. 42,432 (1970) (remarks of Senator Bennett).
122. Id.
123. Chase, supra note 12, at 1238-39 & n.67. See 116 CoNG. REC. 42,953-54 (1970)
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V. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY-BHC CONTROVERSY
A. The Insurance Regulation
Immediately following the 1970 amendments the Board, in
January 1971, proposed a new Regulation y114 for the purpose of
designating certain activities as "closely related" to banking.'2 5 The
regulation lists as an activity closely related to banking:
(9) acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which
the holding company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in
business (or in an office adjacent thereto) with respect to the
following type of insurance:
(i) Any insurance for the holding company and itsubsidi-
aries;
(ii) Any insurance that (a) is directly related to an exten-
sion of credit by a bank or a bank-related firm of the kind de-
scribed in this regulation, or (b) is directly related to the provi-
sion of other financial services by a bank or such a bank-related
firm, or (c) is otherwise sold as a matter of convenience to the
purchaser, so long.as the premium income from sales within this
subdivision (ii)(c) does not constitute a significant portion of the
aggregate insurance premium income of the holding company
from insurance sold pursuant to this subdivision (ii);
(iii) Any insurance sold in a community that (a) has a pop-
ulation not exceeding 5,000, or (b) the holding company demon-
strates that it has inadequate insurance agency facilities ... .
B. Intervention by Insurance Forces
1. GENERAL DEARTH OF INTERVENORS
As noted above,'27 the Board received approximately twenty-
five applications to engage in insurance activities in the period be-
tween 1956 and 1970. In contrast, between January 1971 and De-
cember 1976, the Board permitted 625 notifications to engage de
novo in insurance agency activities.'28 Between June 1972 and De-
(remarks of Congressman Widnall); 116 CONG. REC. 42,424 (1970). (remarks of Senator Spark-
man).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1977).
125. 36 Fed. Reg. 1430 (1971). On May 12, 1971, hearings were held on 12 C.F.R. §
225.4(a)(9) (1977), the insurance agency regulation, and on August 10, 1971, the Board an-
nounced its adoption.
126. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9) (1977).
127. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
128. Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc., Bank Holding Company De Novo Insurance
Agency Expansion (Feb. 24, 1977) (unpublished memorandum on reserve at the office of the
University of Miami Law Review).
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cember 1976, the Board approved 119 applications to acquire ongo-
ing insurance agencies.'29 Although the BHCA affords an opportu-
nity for anyone who would become a competitor of the BHC if its
application were approved to object to the approval of each of these
applications, 3 o most applications have been approved without chal-
lenge.
One reason for the dearth of intervenors is that many applica-
tions sought approval to sell only credit life, health and accident
insurance and mortgage redemption insurance. As noted by the
Board in Worcester Bancorp, Inc. ,"' in which life underwriting asso-
ciations participated as intervenors, the legislative history of the
BHCA indicates that Congress clearly intended that these kinds of
insurance be considered closely related to banking.' In addition,
these types of insurance generally involve small commissions which
often do not justify the transaction costs in terms of the agent's
time. Consequently, few, if any, agents are interested in selling
these types of insurance.'33 The limited chance of obtaining a favor-
able Board ruling, particularly after Worcester Bancorp, Inc.,
combined with the small commissions involved, have resulted in
approval of these applications generally without objection by inter-
venors.
Another explanation for the low rate of intervention is found in
the unique structure of the insurance industry.' The industry can
be broken down into two groups: underwriters, who are in a sense
the wholesalers; and agents, who are the retailers. The underwriters
originate the policies, receive all premiums except the agent's com-
mission, and pay claims. The underwriters are classified into two
distinct groups: those who operate through the American agency
system, and the "direct writers." Agents are the retail sales force
that market the insurance policies to the public.
The American agency companies market their policies through
"independent agents." These agents are not employed by any one
129. Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc., Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of On-
Going Insurance Agencies (Feb. 24, 1977) (unpublished memorandum on reserve at the office
of the University of Miami Law Review).
130. 12 U.S.C. § 1850 (1970).
131. 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1974).
132. Id. at 395.
133. Id.
134. See generally Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc., Lenders Acting as Insurance
Agents: Public Policy Considerations (June 1975) (unpublished manuscript on reserve at
office of the University of Miami Law Review) (hereinafter referred to as Golembe); Indepen-
dent Insurance Agents of America, Bank Holding Company Property and Casualty Insurance
Agencies: Is the Public Likely to Benefit? (undated, unpublished manuscript on reserve at
the office of the University of Miami Law Review) (hereinafter referred to as IIAA).
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underwriter. Generally, they represent more than one company, are
compensated by commissions and theoretically place the customer's
insurance with the underwriter who offers the policy most suited to
that customer's particular needs. There are an estimated 75,000
agencies in the nation,'35 employing Upwards of 300,000 agents,'
with the vast majority employing four or fewer agents.' 7 The direct
writers, on the other hand, market their policies either by mail,
through salaried representatives, or through exclusive or "captive
agents" who represent only one underwriter.
A significant difference between independent agents and cap-
tive agents is that independent agents own their renewals, which
means that the agent is free to decide to place the insurance with a
different underwriter when the policy expires. This difference begets
other differences. It results in somewhat lower premiums for direct
written insurance since the direct writers pay little or no commis-
sion on renewals. Furthermore, salaried and captive agents must
concentrate on generating new business, while independent agents
have an incentive to focus a significant amount of their time on
servicing existing accounts. The independent agents argue that in
return for the higher cost of the policies they sell, the consumer
receives the benefit of having an agent who will seek out the most
appropriate policy at the best price, who will provide continuing
expert service and counselling, and who will act as the consumer's
representative in dealings with the underwriter, particularly where
claims are involved.
Most BHC activity in the insurance area has concentrated on
acting as agents, not underwriters, because Regulation Y only per-
mits very limited underwriting activity. 3 ' When a BHC subsidiary
acts as an insurance agency it markets the underwriters' policies
just like agencies who are not BHC subsidiaries. Thus, BHC insur-
ance subsidiaries do not generally compete with the underwriters,
rather they become new outlets for the underwriters' policies. This
may explain why underwriters have shown no interest in joining the
independent agents in their efforts to contain BHC agency activ-
ity.
39
Consequently, independent agents are the group most seriously
135. IIAA, supra note 134, at 6.
136. Golembe, supra note 134, at 26.
137. Id.
138. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10) (1977) only approves underwriting of credit life, health and
accident insurance.
139. Underwriters have participated, however, in some applications by BHCs requesting
approval to underwrite insurance under 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10) (1977). See, e.g., Worcester
Bancorp, Inc., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1974).
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affected by sale of insurance by BHC subsidiaries. As noted above,,,4
however, these agencies are generally small operations employing
one to four agents. Another explanation, then, for the lack of chal-
lenge to BHC insurance applications has been that the individual
agencies affected by any particular BHC application are too small
to afford the costs (primarily legal fees) involved in challenging the
BHC application in a Board proceeding. In litigation where a mone-
tary award is possible, the litigant bringing the action often decides
whether or not he can "afford" the litigation expenses by treating
the expenses as a gamble and weighing the likelihood of loss against
the likelihood of recovery. Where a recovery is likely enough and in
amount large enough to justify the gamble, the litigant proceeds.
Often this allows a litigant to justify bringing an action which, if he
loses, will cause financial strain. However, if a small insurance
agency opposes Board approval of a BHC application to sell insur-
ance, there is no possible monetary recovery to justify the expenses.
The only possible benefit the agency can hope to gain is that it will
retain the business which it might have lost to the BHC subsidiary.
That loss, of course, is largely speculative. Furthermore, if the
agency is unsuccessful, it will lose not only whatever business the
BHC subsidiary takes away, but also the costs of participating in
the hearings. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why none of the
small agencies have been willing to fight singlehandedly BHC entry
into the market.
2. IIAA PARTICIPATION
The fragmented structure of the industry has not totally fore-
closed representation of the independent agents. What the indepen-
dent agents could not afford to do individually they have done
collectively through their state organizations and, more signifi-
cantly, their national organization, known today as the Independent
Insurance Agents of America ("IIAA").111 The IIAA is composed of
fifty state associations representing more than 33,000 agencies
which employ approximately 150,000 agents."'
The activity of the IIAA began in 1970 when the Board ruled
that the IIAA could participate as an intervenor."' Following that
140. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
141. Prior to January 1976, the IIAA was known as the National Association of Insurance
Agents (NAIA). It will be referred to herein as IIAA even when references are to pre-1976
activities.
142. Competition in Banking Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2721 Before the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976) (statement of Edward
J. Kremer).
143. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 544 (1970). The Board could
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decision, the IIAA participated in a number of ways. In one early
application after the 1970 amendments, the IIAA intervened. The
holding company responded by withdrawing its application insofar
as it related to insurance.'44 Later, when the Board proposed
"simplified procedures" for de novo entry,' 5 the IIAA sued for re-
view and the Board suspended the proposed procedures.' Again,
the IIAA sought review when the Board issued an interpretive rul-
ing' 41 to resolve questions that had arisen concerning the scope and
terms of a previously issued regulation. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, however, found that review at that time was pre-
mature.148 In addition, the IIAA has sought more restrictive legisla-
tion to further limit BHC sale of insurance.'" Finally, the two IIAA
efforts which have dwarfed all of its other activities are its interven-
tions before the Board in Alabama Financial Group, Inc.
(Southern)'50 and First National Holding Corp. (First National).'5'
This intervention has led to what the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has referred to as the "huge commercial tug-of-war between
the bank holding company industry on one hand and independent
insurance agents and other insurance industry groups on the
other."'52
The arguments voiced by the protagonists during the various
stages of this controversy appear throughout the remainder of this
comment. A brief chronology of the controversy hopefully will pro-
vide a perspective helpful in understanding the discussion of those
arguments.
In February 1972, Southern Bancorporation ("Southern") and
First National Holding Corporation ("First National") filed sepa-
rate applications to engage in selling a broad range of insurance
have forced the IIAA to litigate the standing question, possibly causing considerable delay
before the IIAA could participate. Since the IIAA possessed both the expertise and resources
to help the Board identify weaknesses in the bank's presentation, the Board clearly acted in
the best interests of the public by permitting the affected insurance agencies to be represented
through their national association.
144. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 422 (1972).
145. 36 Fed. Reg. 17,328 (1971).
146. 36 Fed. Reg. 25,048 (1971).
147. 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 800 (1972), now appearing at 12 C.F.R. § 225.128 (1977).
148. National Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
489 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
149. See Revised Draft Bill (January 1974) and Revised Draft Bill (August 1974) re-
printed in Golembe, supra note 134, appa. A & B, at 71.
150. See 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548 (1974) (Alabama Financial Group, Inc. is now Southern
Bancorp., Inc.).
151. See 39 Fed. Reg. 33,411 (1974).
152. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 1976).
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services. The types of insurance that either one or both sought to
sell included: (1) credit life, health and accident insurance; (2) in-
surance for the BHC and its subsidiaries; (3) property damage in-
surance on assets being financed by the BHC or any of its subsidiar-
ies; (4) liability insurance for borrowers; (5) insurance otherwise
sold as convenience to the customer; and (6) general insurance in
communities under 5,000 in population.
Notice of the applications was published and the IIAA and
other insurance factions filed objections and requested a hearing.
On March 6, 1973, the Board ordered a formal hearing, and in June
of 1973 the hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Paul
N. Pfeiffer. His decision, rendered in early 1974, denied substantial
portions of the applications. For the most part, the decision could
be characterized as a victory for the insurance interests. However,
the victory was short-lived. In July and September of 1974, the
Board rendered its decisions on the Southern and First National
applications. The Board accepted the administrative law judge's
findings of fact, but drew opposite conclusions which heavily fa-
vored the BHC interests.
After the unfavorable Board orders, IIAA sought judicial review
in the Fifth Circuit pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1969). On June
10, 1976, the court rendered its decision in Alabama Association of
Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (Alabama)."3 The insurance interests regained part of the terri-
tory lost in the Board decision, but in the area of the most heated
controversy, property and liability insurance, the court affirmed the
Board's decision. IIAA filed for rehearing. The Board also petitioned
for rehearing, but on different grounds. On January 10, 1977, the
Fifth Circuit modified its opinion to forbid certain property and
casualty insurance.'54 The January opinion granted the Board time
to make further findings regarding sale of general insurance in com-
munities under 5,000 in population, which the June decision had
held not closely related to banking. Southern and First National
requested further rehearing on January 21, 1977, and February 3,
1977, respectively, as did the Board on February 4, 1977. In the
interim, the HAA had requested the court to stay the issuance of the
mandate so that it could apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.'55 The Fifth Circuit responded by withdrawing the Janu-
153. 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 544 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), petition for rehear-
ing and rehearing en banc denied, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977).
154. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 544
F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1977).
155. Petitioner's Motion to Stay the Issuance of the Mandate at 2.
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ary opinion,'56 denying the petition for rehearing, and holding that
the property and liability insurance forbidden in the January deci-
sion was permissible. The court further held that before the Board
could implement the small community provision, it had to make
further factual determinations.
The remainder of this comment will be devoted to a discussion
and analysis of the substantive issues presented by the controversy.
The "closely related" test will be examined by attempting to define
it and its application to the various kinds of insurance. Thereafter,
the analysis will be completed by examining in depth each factor
of the "public benefits" test that Congress requires the Board to
weigh in determining if an activity's benefits exceed its possible
adverse effects.
VI. STATUTORY TEST ANALYSIS
A. Closely Related
1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1970 amendments, the only guideline the Board
had received from Congress was that BHCs could engage in activi-
ties that were "closely related." Although the pre-1970 BHCA indi-
cated that activities of a "banking, fiduciary or insurance nature"
were contemplated,'57 nothing in the statute helped the Board de-
cide whether any particular insurance activity was indeed closely
related. Essentially, Congress had told the Board that it felt that a
certain nexus to the "business of banking" was required in order for
a BHC to engage in the activity. Closely related suggested some
fairly substantial degree of nexus. Beyond that, the determination
was left to Board discretion.
Despite the Congressional debate surrounding the 1970 amend-
ments,58 the amended Act left the "closely related" language intact
with no further explanation or guidelines as to how the Board should
determine what constitutes a sufficient nexus to satisfy the test. The
Board's own remark that "no precise guidelines were given'"" might
be made more accurate by deletion of the adjective "precise."
The imprecise "closely related" term leaves the Board with
virtually unfettered discretion. Since the entire impact of the stat-
ute depends upon the definition of what is "closely related to bank-
ing," by relinquishing definition of this critical term to Board dis-
156. 544 F.2d at xxv.
157. See Part III supra.
158. See notes 113-23 supra and accompanying text.
159. The Alabama Financial Group, 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
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cretion, Congress has surrendered its legislative role to the Board.'60
In terms of drawing a line between what does and does not have a
sufficient nexus to banking, the "closely related" language is mean-
ingless without extensive interpretation. Such interpretation has
been delegated to the Board due to Congress' failure to provide
sufficient guidelines. The effect on the applicant is that the statute
itself offers little basis for predicting whether a given activity is
permissible. Furthermore, the nebulous "closely related" language
creates a tremendous burden should the applicant seek judicial re-
view of a Board decision. Since the Board's regulations defining
what is "closely related" do not involve the findings typically re-
quired by statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for
an agency hearing, the standard that has been employed is whether
the findings are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.' Proving an abuse of discre-
tion is a difficult burden even when the statutory limits of discretion
are clear. With the legislative history a patchwork of conflicting
intentions and no statutory explanation of the "closely related"
term provided, attempting to prove that the Board abused its dis-
cretion in determining that an activity is closely related will force
appellate courts to assume the legislative function that Congress
surrendered to the Board.
The Board has attempted to remedy the problem of unpredicta-
bility by outlining, in regulations and interpretations, activities that
qualify as closely related to banking. The bulk of this effort is con-
tained in Regulation Y, which lists activities deemed closely related
to banking, including certain insurance agency activities"2 and lim-
ited insurance underwriting activities.' After promulgation of Reg-
ulation Y, questions arose concerning the insurance agency provi-
sions. On September 6, 1972, approximately one year after the in-
surance regulation took effect, the Board issued 12 C.F.R. § 225.128
interpreting 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9). 164 In addition, the Board has
160. Under the non-delegation doctrine, Congress cannot delegate any part of its legisla-
tive duties except under the limitation of a prescribed standard. See United States v. Chi-
cago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). Nonetheless, relatively vague standards
have withstood judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420 (1930) ("just and reasonable" is a sufficient standard). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 28 (1973).
161. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 240 (5th Cir. 1976).
162. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9) (1977).
163. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10) (1977).
164. IIAA unsuccessfully challenged this interpretive rule in federal court. The court
found that the challenge was "premature" since the same issues raised in the proceeding
could be raised before the Board in opposing particular applications. National Ass'n of Ins.
Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 225.126 (1977), which lists activities
deemed not closely related to banking.
According to former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Burns,
the "public benefits" test was added as a separate and distinct
test;'5 however, the public benefits test has entered the Board's
analysis in determining whether an activity should be listed in Reg-
ulation Y as an activity closely related to banking. The Board now
engages in a two-stage closely related analysis. First, as it did before
1970, the Board decides whether an activity has a sufficient nexus
to banking to be closely related. 6 ' Second, the Board applies what
might be called a "generalized public benefits test." The Board has
stated that, in adopting the Insurance Regulation, it "found that
the performance by bank holding companies of those activities au-
thorized by such Regulation satisfied, in general, this public bene-
fits test."'67
The use of such a generalized public benefits test is appropriate
in determining if an activity is closely related to banking. Under the
BHCA as amended in 1970, an applicant must establish that a
proposed activity is both closely related to banking and can generate
public benefits that exceed the adverse effects. It would serve no
purpose for the Board to include activities in Regulation Y which,
while having a sufficient nexus to banking, could never yield bene-
fits that would exceed adverse effects, no matter what specific facts
were presented in the application.
The Board, therefore, applies a "generalized public benefits
test," listing in Regulation Y only those activities which have a
reasonable chance of passing the public benefits test outlined in the
statute as the second requirement for approval. As the IIAA cor-
rectly points out,'68 however, this should not create a presumption
that the listed activity automatically passes the statutory public
benefits test. That test should be applied vigorously to the facts of
each case to ensure that the applicant meets his burden of proving
that his particular application will provide a net benefit to the pub-
lic.
Thus, Congress has left the definition of "closely related" to the
Board. The Board has defined the term by delineating in Regulation
165. 116 CONG. REc. 20,650 (1970) (reference by Senator Sparkman to letter from
Chairman Burns to House and Senate Conferees).
166. See, e.g., Union Bond & Mortg. Co., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 112, 113 (1975) (Board
denied approval, specifically using the term lack of "nexus").
167. First Nat'l Holding Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 33,411, 33,413 (1974).
168. Brief for Petitioner at 52-54, Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (hereinafter IIAA Brief).
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Y those activities which have a sufficient nexus to banking and pass
a generalized public benefits test. The discussion which follows ex-
amines the closely related test as it has been applied to insurance
activities.
2. INSURANCE GENERALLY
In its brief in Alabama, the Board articulated its basis for find-
ing insurance activities as a whole closely related to banking. It
argued that traditionally there has been a close alliance between
commercial banking and insurance, that adequate insurance cover-
age is an integral part of the bank customer's overall financial plan-
ning, and that bankers are knowledgeable in the insurance area and
thus competent to give the necessary advice.' The Board further
demonstrated the relationship between insurance and banking by
noting that the insurance companies typically engage in lending and
other financial services, and that savings and loan associations are
permitted to sell certain kinds of insurance. "'
Aside from assertions that bankers are competent to sell insur-
ance, which IIAA suggests is not the case, 7' these statements are
generally undisputed and do demonstrate certain "relationships"
between the two industries. These general relationships provide a
background upon which the Board overlays the circumstances sur-
rounding the sale of each different kind of insurance to determine
whether sale of a particular type of insurance is closely related to
banking. The following discussion provides an analysis of whether
particular kinds of insurance are closely related to banking.
3. CREDIT LIFE, HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
As discussed above,' there is little disagreement that credit
life, health and accident insurance is closely related to banking. It
should be noted, however, that this consensus of opinion refers only
to decreasing term insurance, where the policy face amount is re-
duced as the loan is repaid. Level term insurance has been found
by the Board to be not closely related to banking.'
In 1973, in Worcester Bancorp, Inc. (Worcester), an application
to engage in sales of credit life, health and accident insurance was
169. Brief for Respondent at 31-32, Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (hereinafter referred to as Board Brief).
170. Id. at 32-33.
171. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 51.
172. See notes 131-33 supra and accompanying text.
173. Fidelity Corp., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 472 (1973).
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challenged by three insurance industry organizations.'74 The admin-
istrative law judge found such insurance closely related to banking
when the loan was made by a bank, but suggested restricting sale
of such insurance in connection with extensions by nonbank subsidi-
aries of the BHC.175 The Board rejected this suggestion. It found that
unrestricted sales by nonbank subsidiaries were also closely related
to banking. 76 In so deciding, the Board relied on the following state-
ment from the Senate Report on the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956:
[T]he operation of a credit life-insurance program in connection
with bank loans is clearly within the scope of banking operations
as presently conducted. So is the operation of an insurance pro-
gram under which insurance proceeds retire the outstanding bal-
ances of the mortgage upon the death of the mortgagor in cases
where the bank holds the mortgage."'
The Board also relied on the legislative history of the 1970
amendments' and specifically pointed out that even the "negative
laundry list" in the House version did not include the sale of credit
life, health and accident insurance.'79
In subsequent applications, the Board's closely related to bank-
ing analysis has often consisted of nothing more than the simple
statement that credit life, health and accident insurance has "been
determined by the Board to be closely related to banking (12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(a)(1) and (9)). ' ' 1s0 In Southern,'' the Board cited and reaf-
firmed its own conclusion in Worcester that credit life, health and
accident insurance is closely related to banking."2 As further ration-
ale for that conclusion, the Board noted that banks require the
customer to obtain credit life, health and accident insurance with
the loan." 3
Even the IIAA has conceded that credit life, health and acci-
dent insurance is closely related to banking.'84 The IIAA argues that
this insurance is distinguishable from other, allegedly not closely
174. 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1974). IIAA was not one of the organizations.
175. Id. at 396.
176. Id.
177. id. at 395.
178. Worcester Bancorp, Inc., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 393, 395 (1974).
179. Id. at 395 n.4.
180. See, e.g., United Carolina Bancshares Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 32,796 (1974); First Ten-
nessee Nat'l Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1974).
181. 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548 (1974).
182. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
183. Id.
184. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 46-48.
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related insurance, because: (1) credit life, health and accident in-
surance only exists as a result of a credit transaction; (2) it is sold
on a group basis at low rates without reference to the borrower's
health or personal condition; (3) it involves no real insurance deci-
sion requiring the advice of an agent: and (4) it has traditionally
been sold by lending institutions and has not been available from
ordinary insurance agents. 8 5 Since IIAA concedes that this insur-
ance is closely related to banking, the issue was not raised before
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Alabama.'
The most compelling reason for finding credit life, health and
accident insurance to be closely related to banking is the legislative
history cited by the Board in Worcester. While the history is of little
assistance in determining whether Congress intended to include
other types of insurance, and in fact it appears that those voting for
the bill had intentions that were far from uniform, it is reasonable
to conclude that the majority of those legislators involved intended
that credit life, health and accident insurance should be considered
closely related.'87 To the extent that it authorizes such insurance, 12
C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(ii)(a) should be upheld by the courts.
While the IIAA's reasons for distinguishing credit life, health
and accident issurance from other types of insurance may or may
not have proven that the other types of insurance are not closely
related, the explanations certainly suggest that credit life, health
and accident insurance is the most closely related to banking of the
various types of insurance.
4. MORTGAGE REDEMPTION AND MORTGAGE GUARANTEE INSURANCE
Mortgage redemption insurance is generally categorized with
credit life, health and accident insurance in applications and for
purposes of Board analysis. Its function in a mortgage loan transac-
tion is similar to that of credit life, health and accident insurance
in non-mortgage loans. As with credit life, health and acccident
insurance, the legislative history indicates that the legislators con-
sidered mortgage redemption insurance to be closely related to
banking.' 8 Thus, the Board properly concluded in Worcester that
185. Id. at 48-49.
186. The court stated in Alabama that credit life, health and accident insurance "are
not in issue here." Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 233 (5th Cir. 1976).
187. There is, however, some evidence in the legislative history suggesting that while
credit life and mortgage redemption insurance were viewed as closely related, credit accident
insurance and, by omission, credit health insurance were not. See IIAA Brief, supra note 168,
at 36-37.
188. See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
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mortgage redemption insurance is closely related to banking.
Prior to the Board's Southern decision mortgage guarantee in-
surance, which serves to protect the lender against loss of a specified
percentage of a loan in the event of a foreclosure and sale of collat-
eral, had been equated with mortgage redemption insurance." 9 Sub-
sequent to approving mortgage guarantee insurance in Southern,
however, the Board has reversed its position.'90
6. PROPERTY INSURANCE
"Property" insurance covers physical damage to property in
which the bank has taken a security interest as collateral for an
extension of credit. Unlike credit life, health and accident insur-
ance, the premiums for property damage insurance can be fairly
substantial. In addition, a significant percentage of purchases of
real property and higher priced personal property, such as automo-
biles, are financed by BHC subsidiaries. Therefore, should the
courts determine that sale of property insurance is a permissible
activity, a major reallocation annually of millions of premium dol-
lars may follow, depending upon whether BHCs are able to compete
successfully for that business.
The administrative law judge who conducted the hearings in
Southern did not address property insurance separately. After a
fairly extensive review of the BHCA's legislative history, he found
that "[a] fair summary of the legislative history . . . indicates that
the Congress clearly had credit-related insurance agency sales in
mind as an enterprise closely related to banking."'' In particular,
he relied on remarks by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Martin, cited by Senator Bennett, to the effect that "[p]ermissible
acquisitions might include . . . acting as insurance agent . . . in
connection with extensions of credit by other subsidiaries of the
holding company."' 92
The Board agreed with the administrative law judge, finding
that property insurance fell within subsection (ii)(a) of the insur-
ance provision in Regulation Y and was in accord with the Board's
previous interpretations of that provision.' 3 In relying upon its own
regulation and interpretation, the Board was essentially stating that
189. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
190. See Board Brief, supra note 169, at 20 n.15, citing 39 Fed. Reg. 39,502 (1974).
191. Recommended Decision of Law Judge in FRB Docket No. IA-8 (First Nat'l Holding
Corp.), reprinted in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, app. 4, at 52a.
192. Id. at 49a.
193. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
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property insurance is closely related because the Board says it is;-
however, the Board added the following rationale:
[Property] insurance is essential from the lender's stand-
point to assure that the value of the collateral will not be im-
paired by physical damage. The financial nature of the insurance
transaction forms an integral function for the borrower as well,
since the presence or lack of insurance protecting loan collateral
is an essential element of credit evaluation."'
As indicated previously,'95 in the Southern order the Board rea-
soned that BHCs should be able to sell credit life, health and acci-
dent insurance because the borrower is required by the bank to have
it. This argument is valid only because that insurance is generally
unavailable elsewhere. Most agents do not carry it. However, where
the insurance is readily available from agents, the need for the
insurance might justify the BHCs requiring that the borrower ob-
tain it, but it in no way supports the contention that the BHC
should be able to market it. Similarly, where the bank does not
require the insurance, but does consider the presence or lack of it
in evaluating credit, there is no basis for concluding that the bank
should sell the insurance. "'
The opposing parties in Alabama'97 have each attempted to
establish that the BHCA's legislative history supports their respec-
tive positions. The Board argues that it had approved property in-
surance before 1970, and that Congressional approval of the 1970
amendments without criticism of the pre-amendment Board deci-
sions implied approval of those decisions." 8 In addition, the Board
argued that the 1970 amendments were designed to give the Board
greater flexibility."'
The IIAA has responded, claiming that Congress viewed the
previous Board decisions as limited, narrow authorizations of prop-
erty insurance sales based primarily on local practice, that contin-
ued approval of only limited activities was intended, and that sale
of property insurance generally is not such a limited activity. 00
The Fifth Circuit noted in Alabama that it must give "great
respect" to pre-1970 decisions, since "Congress gave no indication
194. Id.
195. See notes 182-83 supra and accompanying text.
196. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 49 n.28.
197. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
198. Board Brief, supra note 169, at 44-49.
199. Id. at 49-58.
200. Reply Brief of the Petitioner at 4-9, Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
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of its dissatisfaction of the agency's interpretation of the scope of its
• . . jurisdiction when it amended the Act.""'' This is not entirely
accurate. If all of the legislators had been completely satisfied with
the Board's interpretation of the closely related test, there would
have been no heated debate on the issues of changing the language
to "functionally related" and adding a negative laundry list. Fur-
thermore, the IIAA points out that the pre-1970 applications were
unchallenged, so neither the Board nor Congress was aware of the
arguments to be made in opposition.120 The IIAA also convincingly
argues that these decisions rested heavily on the fact that there was
long-established area practice for banks to sell the insurance. 03
As discussed above,0 4 the only conclusion that can be drawn
from the record with certainty is that the legislators who created
and voted for the 1970 amendments had conflicting views on what
the amendments were intended to accomplish. Thus, the court's
reliance upon inferred Congressional approval of pre-1970 decisions
seems unjustified.
The court in Alabama rejected the IIAA argument that prop-
erty damage insurance is not closely related because it is neither
"functionally equivalent to an extension of credit" nor
"operationally integrated into the lending transaction. '" 0 5 The court
stated that the Board should be upheld when it articulates "any
type connection between banking and the non-banking activity in
question which makes it rational to consider the proposed activity
an 'incident' to banking." 00 One might ask whether the "closely
related" test has now become a "rational incident" test.
The court then concluded that property insurance was closely
related because the banks need it to protect the collateral, and the
borrowers need it to obtain credit. The court stated that since prop-
erty insurance is "regularly desired" by both, it is closely related. 07
One might conclude, therefore, that "closely related" is a "regular
mutual need" test. The IIAA has suggested, somewhat sarcastically,
that such a test would justify banks selling automobiles, since the
bank needs the automobile to give rise to automobile loans, and the
201. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 239 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
202. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 38.
203. Id. at 38-39.
204. See notes 113-23 supra and accompanying text.
205. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 244 (5th Cir. 1976).
206. Id. at 244.
207. Id.
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customer cannot obtain the loan without an automobile. 20 8
In July of 1976, IIAA requested a rehearing by the Fifth Circuit.
One argument raised was that the June 10, 1976 decision did not
make clear whether only bank subsidiaries of the BHC could sell
property insurance, or whether the nonbank subsidiaries could mar-
ket it as well. IIAA argued that since the court had drawn a distinc-
tion between the kinds of subsidiaries when it invalidated 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(a)(9)(i) to the extent that the regulation allowed the BHC
to broker insurance for its nonbank subsidiaries, consistency re-
quired that the distinction be made in the property insurance area
as well. On January 10, 1977, the court modified the June 10 deci-
sion to invalidate 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(i)(a) and (b) to the extent
that these regulations permitted property insurance sales by non-
bank subsidiaries."' This decision was later withdrawn on August
3, 1977,10 when the court held that sale of property insurance by
nonbank subsidiaries was permissible.
On January 21, 1977, Southern petitioned for further rehearing,
and, in February, both First National and the Board similarly peti-
tioned. They argued that sale of property insurance was permitted
before 1970 and, therefore, was implicitly approved by Congress in
1970;1" that the ruling would result in unhealthy manipulation of
loans in that loans normally made by nonbank subsidiaries would
be made by bank subsidiaries to avoid the restriction on nonbank
subsidiary sale of insurance;"' that an activity performed by banks
becomes "banking" by virtue of the fact that banks do it, and is still
"banking" even when performed by a nonbank entity;"' that the
decision would have a severe national impact;' 4 and that the deci-
sion created a severe "inconsistency," since nonbank subsidiaries
are allowed to sell credit life, health and accident insurance without
distinction .2 1 All the petitions for rehearing were denied by the Fifth
Circuit in the August opinion.
Thus, the dispute over property insurance has spawned lan-
guage by the interested parties and the courts which, rather than
208. Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing In Banc (sic) at
13.
209. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 544
F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1977) (withdrawn at request of court 544 F.2d at xxv).
210. 544 F.2d at xxv.
211. Intervenors' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc at 5-9;
Petition for Rehearing of the Respondent Board of Governors at 8-9.
212. Petition for Rehearing of the Respondent Board of Governors at 9.
213. Id. at 9-10; Intervenors' Petition for Further Rehearing at 4.
214. Petition for Rehearing of the Respondent Board of Governors at 10; Intervenors'
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 4-5.
215. Petition for Rehearing of the Respondent Board of Governors at 6.
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clarifying the definition of closely related, has created even more
ambiguity and uncertainty.
6. 'LIABILITY INSURANCE
"The liability insurance at issue would protect borrowers from
liability resulting from injury or damage to the person or property
of others in connection with property financed by holding company
banks." ' Generally, this insurance is marketed in a "package" with
property insurance.
In an interpretive ruling, "' the Board decreed that liability in-
surance is credit related if it "supports the lending transaction."
The Board has also indicated that where the liability insurance is
customarily sold in a "package," such as with automobile or home-
owner's liability insurance, the sale supports the extension of
credit."'8
The Board argues that, like property insurance, liability insur-
ance is needed by the bank to guarantee that the borrower will be
able to repay the loan. However, this argument would apply to any
insurance, since insurance is always purchased in order to avoid a
potential financial loss, and any such loss could affect the bor-
rower's ability to repay. The argument is more directly relevant vis-
a-vis property damage insurance, since that insurance safeguards
the specific collateral which has been put up as security for the loan.
Without secured collateral, the bank would be left standing in line
with other creditors. But if the borrower is unable to repay the loan
due to some added liability he incurs, the bank would still be pro-
tected because it has a security interest in the collateral ahead of
other creditors. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the bank is better
off if there is liability insurance than if it were to foreclose, because
"repayment rather than repossession is the bank's primary objec-
tive."2 ' While this may be true, clearly the bank's need for property
damage insurance is significantly more related to the loan than its
need for liability insurance. The difference is underscored by the
fact that banks generally require property insurance, while liability
insurance is optional.22
In its order in Southern, the Board simply stated that since the
216. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 244 (5th Cir. 1976).
217. 12 C.F.R. § 225.128(c)(1) (1977).
218. 12 C.F.R. § 225.128(c)(1)(iii) (1977).
219. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 245 (5th Cir. 1976).
220. Id. at 249.
[Vol. 32:543
SALE OF INSURANCE BY BANK SUBSIDIARIES
insurance is generally sold as part of a "package," it "fulfills a
legitimate need of the lender and borrower alike.""'' The HAA ob-
jects that such reasoning is tantamount to saying that liability in-
surance is "closely related to an activity which is closely related to
banking, thus itself becoming closely related to banking. 2 22 This
phrasing suggests that perhaps the Board has stretched the argu-
ment too far. The Fifth Circuit, however, approved the logic but
restated the Board's language more subtly, concluding that while
the case for liability insurance is "significantly weaker"2 ' than that
for property insurance, liability insurance is 'incidental' to the sale
of property damage insurance and necessary for effectuation of the
Congressional purpose with respect to [that] . . .activity. ' 24 Ap-
parently then, if an activity is "incidental" to a closely related
activity, the incidental activity is itself closely related.
The court added, almost as an afterthought to bolster its con-
clusion, that there had been two pre-1970 approvals of liability in-
surance sales. As with property insurance, this argument pales when
one considers that the "functionally related" and "negative laundry
list" debates suggest some Congressional disapproval of pre-1970
Board orders, and that these pre-1970 decisions were unchallenged
and based heavily on long-stafiding area practice.
While liability insurance alone has not been held closely related
to banking, its fate throughout the Fifth Circuit decision and subse-
quent modifications has been directly linked to that of property
insurance. As of the August decision, liability insurance is consid-
ered closely related to banking when purchased with property insur-
ance and sold by any BHC subsidiary, bank or nonbank.
7. CONVENIENCE INSURANCE
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(ii)(c) authorizes BHCs to act as agents
with respect to insurance that:
is otherwise sold as a matter of convenience to the purchaser, so
long as the premium income from sales within this subdivision
(ii)(c) does not constitute a significant portion of the aggregate
insurance premium income of the holding company from insur-
ance sold pursuant to this subdivision (ii) . ...
By interpretive ruling225 the Board has limited premiums from
221. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
222. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 59.
223. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 244 (5th Cir. 1976).
224. Id. at 250.
225. 12 C.F.R. § 225.128(e) (1977).
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such sales to less than five percent of the aggregate premium income
of the BHC agency. In its order in Southern, the Board simply
stated that such insurance has been expressly permitted under the
Insurance Regulation. "' In its brief to the Court of Appeals, the
Board argued that convenience insurance is a "necessary activity to
the operation of an affiliated insurance agency."2 7 The Board sug-
gested, for instance, that such insurance allows the BHC to renew
the insurance of an elderly driver who has repaid his loan and can-
not purchase insurance elsewhere without difficulty, and also allows
a borrower to insure his second car on the same policy. Therefore,
it is the Board's argument that the five percent limit, the caveat
that the convenience provision may not be used to engage in general
insurance business, and the need to sell such insurance to meet the
particular needs of a few customers, conjoin to make the activity
closely related.
The IIAA argued in their brief to the Fifth Circuit that the cur-
rent language of the regulation is too broad. 28 IIAA concedes that
certain convenience insurance (a renewal, for instance) is closely
related to banking. IIAA objects, however, to the broad language
that apparently allows sales of insurance totally unrelated to bank-
ing. IIAA also suggests that the five percent limit be reduced to one
or two percent. 29
The Fifth Circuit agreed with IIAA on the issue of broadness.
It accepted the idea that an incidental activity necessary to carrying
on permissible ones is closely related, but found it difficult to see
how serving the particular needs of a few customers was necessary.230
The court held the regulation invalid and suggested that the Board
redraft it.
8. GENERAL INSURANCE IN COMMUNITIES UNDER 5,000 POPULATION
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(iii) permits the BHC agency to sell "any
insurance. . . in a community that (a) has a population not exceed-
ing 5,000, or (b) the holding company demonstrates it has inade-
quate insurance agency facilities."
This provision is apparently derived from 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1970)
under which national banks have been permitted to engage in such
insurance sales since 1916.11 In approving such applications, the
226. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550-51 (1974).
227. Board Brief, supra note 169, at 63.
228. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 69.
229. Id.
230. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 242 (5th Cir. 1976).
231. Id. at 248.
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Board has usually stated that guch activitieg have been "6previously
determined by regulation to be closely related to banking (12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(a)(9))."
2 32
In its June 10, 1976 decision, the Fifth Circuit found this regula-
tion invalid.2 3  It noted that 12 U.S.C. § 92 was intended to provide
necessary additional income to small banks to improve stability and
profitability, 2  and should not be interpreted to mean that such
activities were "banking."
On its face, the decision seems insignificant. After all, if the
BHC is not allowed to form a nonbank subsidiary to sell such insur-
ance, it can simply have the bank subsidiary sell it under 12 U.S.C.
§ 92. However, there is a significant tax consequence that may have
a severe impact upon the transferability of small independent
banks .23 Often small BHCs were sold to long term employees who
finance the purchase and rely on insurance revenues to repay these
large loans.236 Only about forty percent of bank profits may be paid
to the BHC as dividends. Thus, if only the bank rather than non-
bank subsidiaries may sell the insurance, the amount of money
available to the BHC to repay the loans is severely reduced. It has
been suggested that if the Fifth Circuit decision of June 10th stands,
the smaller banks will be taken over by large BHCs, since without
insurance revenues small purchasers will be unable to meet their
debt obligations.
237
The Board was apparently surprised by the June decision and
requested rehearing. In the January 10, 1977 decision, the court
modified its stance and granted the Board time to make additional
findings to establish the close relationship between banking and sale
of general insurance in small communities, and to determine
whether the current language might permit activities which were
not intended, such as general insurance sales in small communities
by BHCs that are not located in those communities. 23 The August
decision instructed the Board not to implement the small com-
munity regulation until it supported with further findings the con-
clusion that such insurance is closely related to banking.239 Conse-
232. See, e.g., Cody Agency, Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 736 (1972).
233. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 243 (5th Cir. 1976).
234. Id. at 248.
235. See THE INDEPENDENT BANKER 12, 14 (Mar. 1977).
236. Id. at 14.
237. Id. at 15.
238. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 544
F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1977) (case withdrawn by request of court).
239. 558 F.2d 729, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1977).
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quently, this regulation is not in force pending further Board action.
9. MISCELLANEOUS INSURANCE SALES
The kinds of insurance discussed above have been those upon
which the controversy has focused. Several other types of insurance
have been mentioned and will be discussed briefly.
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(i) permits sale of "any insurance for the
holding company and its subsidiaries." The court invalidated this
provision insofar as it allowed the sale of insurance to nonbank
subsidiaries but found the sale of insurance to bank subsidiaries of
the BHC permissible.240 The court found that the bank subsidiaries
needed certain kindsof insurance; but, how this justifies BHC sale
of the insurance is far from clear. The bank subsidiaries need many
goods and services, but that does not authorize the BHC to sell those
goods and services to them. The court noted that even sales to bank
subsidiaries have a relationship to banking that is "in many cases
quite indirect; in many cases the bank's need for it is no different
than the need of any business enterprise."24"' While the court seemed
less than pleased with this relationship, it noted its limited role in
reviewing the Board's decision and refused to overturn it. The court
went only so far as to find that sales to nonbank subsidiaries of the
BHC were not closely related to banking because "[s]uch insur-
ance simply does not contribute to the operations of those subsidiar-
ies actually engaged in the banking business." ' This language sug-
gests still another closely related test: a "contribution to opera-
tions" test.
BHCs have also sought to sell use and occupancy insurance,
business interruption insurance, fidelity insurance, and surety
bonds.' The Board declined to find the first three of these closely
related on the ground that insufficient evidence was presented by
the applicants. The Board found that surety bonds traditionally had
been part of the mortgage transaction and were directly related to
an extension of credit. The Fifth Circuit discussed surety bonds vis-
a-vis public benefits, but affirmed without discussion the Board's
closely related decision.
Conclusions regarding the application of the closely related and
public benefits tests will be made after reviewing the public bene-
fits test. For the present, it is sufficient to note that an adminis-
240. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1976).
241. Id. at 241.
242. Id.
243. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,550 (1974).
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trative law judge, a federal agency, and a federal circuit court have
each applied the term "closely related" to these facts, but no two
have been able to agree on the results. Attempts to clarify the
term have merely added more conflicting and meaningless verbiage
to a term whose very drafters could probably not reach any consen-
sus as to definition.
B. Public Benefits
1. INTR'ODUCTION
In 1970 Congress added the following language to 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c) (8):
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident
to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall con-
sider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding com-
pany can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the pub-
lic, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains
in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practice."'
It is interesting to note that there is one significant difference
between this test, which determines whether a BHC may engage in
a particular activity, and the test in section 1842(c) (2), which deter-
mines whether an applicant may become a BHC. Under the section
1842(c)(2) test, the Board is not to approve an application to be-
come a BHC "unless it finds that the anti-competitive effects of the
proposed transactions are clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served." ''4 The section 1843(c)(8)
test does not require that the benefits "clearly" outweigh the ad-
verse effects. It merely requires that they "reasonably be expected"
to outweigh "possible" adverse effects.
The significance of this difference is most apparent in cases
where it is determined that there are no adverse effects. The "clearly
outweigh" language of section 1842 suggests that even when there
are no adverse effects, a minimum threshold amount of benefit must
be reached before an applicant may become a BHC. Under the
section 1843(c)(8) test, however, even a de minimis benefit will
apparently be sufficient to warrant approval where there are no
adverse effects.
244. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970) (emphasis added).
245. 12 U.S.C. .§ 1842(c)(2) (1970).
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A second significant difference between the two tests is found
in the "possible adverse effects" language of the section 1843(c)(8)
test. The adjective "possible" suggests that the Board may have
more freedom to speculate in finding adverse effects to balance
under the section 1843(c)(8) test, making this test harder to pass.
These two tests, of course, are designed to handle two different
situations. In some cases, however, the difference may be one more
of form than substance. For instance, if an insurance agency seeks
to acquire a bank, it must, under section 1842, obtain permission
to become a BHC. To do so, it must demonstrate that the associa-
tion of the bank and the insurance agency will yield public benefits
that clearly outweigh the adverse effects. If a BHC seeks to acquire
an insurance agency, it must apply for permission under section
1843(c)(8), and demonstrate that the public benefits are reasonably
expected to outweigh possible adverse effects. In both cases, the
result sought is the same - sale of insurance through a BHC subsid-
iary. The controlling factor in determining which test applies is
simply which entity is making the application. To the extent that
the applications which seek to achieve almost identical results are
subjected to the two arguably different tests, there appears to be an
inherent inconsistency.
The language of the section 1843(c)(8) test, particularly the
presentation of the factors to be considered in the analysis, may
suggest at first glance that there are three benefits to be balanced
against four possible adverse effects. A more careful analysis reveals
that there is an alternative conceptualization of the test that leads
to a more thorough understanding. Note that "increased competi-
tion" is one of the listed benefits, while "decreased or unfair compe-
tition" is one of the listed possible adverse effects. This is certainly
appropriate. If increased competition is desirable, it is only logical
that decreased competition is undesirable. However, it seems just
as logical, although not explicitly stated, that if increased conven-
ience and gains in efficiency are benefits to the public, then any
resultant inconvenience or reduction in efficiency are adverse ef-
fects. For instance, bank-related agencies might drive out of busi-
ness other more convenient insurance agencies, or reduce the reve-
nues of all other agencies whose fixed costs might then make them
less efficient and result in higher prices or reduced services. In addi-
tion, a bank-related agency might be more convenient, but less
efficient. Should resulting inconvenience not then be balanced
against possible increased convenience to see if the bank-agency
affiliation does really generate a net public benefit? Similarly, if
undue concentration of resources is adverse, diversification of re-
sources should be a benefit. The public would also benefit if the
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bank-agency association eliminates some conflict of interest that
might exist under the current system, such as banks recommending
insurance agencies to those who purchase bank services, or if bank
sale of insurance leads to sounder banking by enabling the bank to
better determine if its collateral is properly insured. Thus, rather
than three benefits and four adverse effects, section 1843(c)(8) really
suggests six factors that the Board should weigh, each of which may
be a net benefit or detriment to the community: convenience, com-
petition, efficiency, concentration of resources, conflicts of interests,
and banking soundness.
The following discussion of these six factors will include, as did
the closely related discussion, a review of the Board's orders in the
Southern and First National applications. Two points should be
kept in mind during that discussion. The first is that one reason the
discussion focuses on these cases is that the majority of the Board's
decisions offer little insight into the reasoning behind the Board's
conclusions. While cursory treatment of the closely related test may
be appropriate in some cases, the nature of the public benefits test
suggests that a more rigorous analysis generally would be appropri-
ate. When an applicant seeks to engage in an activity which has
been determined by regulation or previous decision to be closely
related, there is little reason for the Board to do more than point
out that the activity has been previously determined to be closely
related to banking. However, the public benefits test w as added to
ensure that in addition to falling into a'category that was closely
related to banking, each individual application would result in a
benefit to the public. To make such a determination the Board must
consider the unique circumstances of each application, including an
analysis of the banking and insurance industries in a particular
market.
The Board's decisions, however, do not evidence a detailed ex-
amination of specific circumstances. For instance, in United Caro-
lina Bancshares Corp. (United Carolina),24 the Board made the
following statement: "Based upon the foregoing and other consider-
ations reflected in the record, the Board has determined, in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 4(c)(8), that consummation of
this proposal can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the
public that outweigh possible adverse effects." '47 Unfortunately for
those interested in understanding the Board's reasoning, the
"foregoing" was the simple statement that "[tihere is no evidence
246. 39 Fed. Reg. 32,796 (1974).
247. Id. at 32,796 (emphasis added).
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in the record indicting that consummation of the proposed transac-
tion would result in any undue concentration of resources, unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices or
other adverse effects on the public interest." '248
Other applications single out one adverse factor for specific
mention, but even then do little more than make two conclusory
statements instead of one. For instance, in First Tennessee National
Corp. (First Tennessee), 4" the Board offered the following analysis:
"From the facts of record, and in view of the nature of Tower's
insurance business, it does not appear that the continuation of these
insurance activities upon approval of the application would have
any adverse effect on existing or future competition.""25 In United
Carolina, the Board's analysis again consisted of nothing more than
a statement to the effect that the record revealed no adverse effects.
The Board's treatment of benefits is often equally cursory. In
First Tennessee, the only benefit mentioned was that
"[c]onsummation of this proposal should enable Tower to become
a more effective competitor."25' In United Carolina, a loan company
which sold insurance was to be acquired. The Board stated that
consummation would increase financial resources of the BHC and
provide pro-competitive management direction.2 52 These remarks
seem to apply only to the loan activities of the acquired company,
not to its insurance agency activities. Although insurance premiums
may make available some additional resources, every insurance
application would have this result. The argument that an acquisi-
tion makes additional resources available is not mentioned in appli-
cations which involve the acquisition solely of an insurance agency.
One could conclude, then, that no specific benefits of the sale of
insurance were considered. An example of an even more blatant
failure to consider specific benefits is the approval in Citizens In-
vestment Co. ,253 in which the Board failed to mention the public
benefits test at all. Many applications combine remarks on adverse
effects similar to those noted above 54 with a remark like that in
Mountain Financial Services, Inc. ,255 in which the Board stated as
the only benefit that "[a]pproval of the application to engage in
such [insurance] activities would insure a convenient source of
248. Id.
249. 39 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1974).
250. Id. at 26,319.
251. Id.
252. United Carolina Bancshares Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 32,796 (1974).
253. 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 143 (1972).
254. See notes 247-49 supra and accompanying text.
255. 42 Fed. Reg. 4,213 (1977).
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credit related insurance services to Bank's customers. ' '2 6
The Board's reliance upon the absence of evidence of adverse
effects in the record raises a serious question about its role in apply-
ing the public benefits test, particularly when applications are un-
challenged. When an administrative agency performs a quasi-
judicial function in settling disputes between adversary parties, it
may be appropriate to rely solely upon the "record." When the
applicant has no adversary, however, the Board is charged with a
role that in effect makes the Board both the judge and the counsel
for the general public. The Board is to determine if the public will
benefit. When the application is unchallenged, the Board is review-
ing a "record" presented by the applicant alone. While the appli-
cant is required to supply the Board with "facts," it is not uncom-
mon that opposing parties may have radically different views of
what the "facts" are, or of how they should be viewed. Even when
there is an intervening party, the question remains whether this
totally relieves the Board of its responsibility as the guardian of the
public interest and transfers that responsibility to the shoulders of
an intervenor who, while opposing the applicant, may be involved
only to promote his own private interests, not to benefit the public.
As will be discussed belowil 7 it might not be unreasonable to expect
the Board to make certain factual inquiries independently in order
to insure that the public is properly protected.
When an appellate court reviews the Board's public benefits
decisions, the court applies a different standard than it does in
reviewing the "closely related to banking" determinations. Since a
regulation defining what is closely related "does not involve findings
'required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing,' "58 the court determines only whether the
Board's findings are " 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.' "2"' However, the Board's
public benefits findings are on a record generated by an agency
hearing, and the standard of review is that there must be
"'substantial evidence'" to support the Board's conclusions.6 0
Thus, the court has considerably more freedom to reexamine and
possibly overrule Board findings on the public benefits question.
Against this background, the individual factors to be consid-
256. Id.
257. See Part VI.B.3. infra.
258. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
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ered by the Board in determining if the public benefits exceed the
possible adverse effects will now be examined.
2. CONVENIENCE
The main form of increased convenience that the BHCs suggest
will occur is the "one-stop shopping" which may result if a bank
sells insurance on the premises. Instead of having to make the trip
to an insurance agent, the customer may purchase his credit-related
insurance at the bank while finalizing the loan. In addition to the
time saved by not making a special trip to an agent, it is argued
further that the time devoted to the insurance transaction will be
reduced because much of the information needed has already been
given to the bank in the loan application, thus avoiding the duplica-
tion that would occur if the customer had to repeat that information
to an agent. Applicants have suggested that one further convenience
is that when insurance is purchased from a bank, premiums can be
added to loan payments so the customer pays both with one check.
The Board has often found that the sale of insurance at the
bank premises would result in added convenience. The Board's pub-
lished decisions, however, generally provide no information as to
how the Board reached this conclusion. The decisions often simply
remark that "consideration relating to the convenience and needs
of the communities to be served" are "consistent with approval."',
In his recommended decisions on the applications of Southern
and First National, the administrative law judge found that the
degree of increased convenience would be minimal."' In a third,
similar case, the judge found that there were as many as twenty-five
insurance agencies within four blocks of one bank office.6 3 In the
Southern and First National applications the BHC did not plan to
have an agent at each bank office. The administrative law judge
noted in the Southern decision that this would make personalized
service relatively inconvenient. 4 The administrative law judge also
noted that some types of insurance may be obtained from an agent
261. See, e.g., Mountain Financial Services, Inc., 42 Fed. Reg. 4,213 (1977); Citizens Inv.
Co., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 843 (1972).
262. Recommended Decision of Law Judge in FRB Docket No. IA-10 (Alabama Case),
excerpts reprinted in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, app. 3, at 34a; Recommended Decision of
Law Judge in FRB Docket No. IA-8 (First National Holding Corp.), excerpts reprinted in id.
at 54a.
263. Recommended Decision of Law Judge in FRB Docket Nos. IA-3, 6, 7, 12, 13 (Florida
cases), excerpts reprinted in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, app. 2 at 10a.
264. Recommended Decision of Law Judge in FRB Docket No. IA-10 (Alabama Case),
excerpts reprinted in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, app. 3, at 34a.
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over the phone, '65 that in other types there is a substantial time lag
before the policy has to be delivered, 6' and that where the bank
buys dealer paper, the customer normally will not be able to con-
summate his borrowing and insurance purchase at the same time
and place. ' The above comments related to non-commercial insur-
ance, but the administrative law judge found that bank sale of
commercial insurance adds even less convenience, since sophisti-
cated commercial buyers frequently have their own insurance
agents. '
The Board disagreed, finding that the added convenience was
a significant public benefit. In Southern, the Board found a
"considerable savings in time." ' The Board conceded that the lack
of agents at each facility reduced the convenience, but that there
was still this "considerable" savings since the loan officer would
contact the agent at the main branch for the borrower.7 0 In its
decision on the First National application two months later, the
Board found a "savings in time," but it was not described as
"considerable."2" The Board there also responded to the adminis-
trative law judge's conclusions regarding commercial insurance,
noting that the information needed for commercial loans and com-




The administrative law judge based his findings upon what
appears to be a thoughtful inquiry into the practical factors, such
as the convenience and the location of other insurance agencies, and
thorough consideration of the logical arguments presented. If the
Board engaged in any analysis, its decision does not reflect it; how-
ever, in its brief in the Alabama case the Board expanded its reason-
ing somewhat. It conceded that the lack of agents at all bank outlets
results in "substantially less" convenience, ' 3 but argued that the
bank planned to add more agents as needed, and that the conven-
ience factor was preserved as a benefit since the bank was arranging
the insurance despite the absence of an agent.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying the
265. Recommended Decision of Law Judge in FRB Docket Nos. IA-3, 6, 7,12, 13 (Florida
cases), excerpts reprinted in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, app. 2, at 10a.
266. Id. at 11a.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,551 (1974) (emphasis
added).
270. Id.
271. First Nat'l Holding Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 33,411, 33,413 (1974).
272. Id.
273. Board Brief, supra note 169, at 82.
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"substantial evidence" test, overturned the Board's findings. 74 The
court noted that without agents at bank branches the insurance
transaction would lack the personal, face-to-face discussion which
makes arranging insurance matters "much easier, ' 275 that is, more
convenient. The court also concluded' that the same convenience
that the Board argued was being offered could be achieved by the
bank contacting an independent agent for the customer.2 7
One additional argument has been raised by the insurance par-
ticipants outside the proceedings and not commented upon by ei-
ther the Board or the Fifth Circuit. Although bank sale of insurance
allows the customer to purchase insurance and to obtain a loan at
one stop, it forces the customer to purchase insurance from two
different sources, some from the bank and other kinds from his
insurance agent. This may create other inconveniences. It is argued
that the customer sacrifices one form of "one-stop shopping" in
order to gain another.2 7 Furthermore, the insurance agents argue
that when the insurance transaction is complicated, the loan officer
will not be able to handle it, so another individual will have to be
called in. 275 Allegedly, this eliminates the proposed convenience of
giving all the necessary information to one person. 27
Since convenience is one element in the balancing test which
calls for comparing it and other benefits to various adverse effects,
even if the Board is correct and there is some net convenience, the
amount or significance of that convenience is a relevant question.
In some businesses, one-stop shopping may be a convenience each
individual consumer will recognize. For instance, in food shopping,
a consumer may truly appreciate a small savings of fifteen minutes
to an hour a week. But, even assuming that the trip to an indepen-
dent agent does take as much as an extra hour, which might not be
274. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1976).
275. Id. at 252.
276. Id.
277. IIAA, supra note 134, at 29.
278. Id. at 28.
279. It might be logically counterargued that the consumer should be allowed to choose
which inconvenience he finds easier to endure. However, it should be remembered that the
burden here is on the BHC to prove that greater convenience will result if that is one of the
benefits the BHC relies upon. Thus, the insurance company does not have to prove that the
inconvenience is sufficient to justify denying a choice to the consumer. That inconvenience
is argued to counter the BHC convenience argument in the hopes of showing that the BHC
has failed to meet its burden of proving that increased convenience will result. Furthermore,
the possibility of voluntary tying suggests that the public's choice may not be based on
convenience, thus the mere fact that consumers may purchase bank insurance would not
prove that bank insurance was more convenient. See text preceding and accompanying notes
306-13 infra.
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the case with agents located a block away, how many times a year
does the average person purchase credit insurance? True, one might
buy a home, two cars and a boat as well as finance a business all in
one year, but even that is only a savings of a maximum of five hours.
Of course, this is speculation; but, it would be hard to imagine an
average savings per person nationwide of more than an hour or two,
a year. The one exception may be in the credit life, health and
accident area where the insurance is not readily available from inde-
pendent agents. To the economist, a savings of an hour per year
multiplied by millions of consumers may constitute an efficiency
that will indirectly benefit the public. To the consumers themselves,
however, a savings of an hour is one they are not likely to notice.
Thus, even if the Board's conclusion that increased convenience
would result from bank sale of insurance is correct, there is a legiti-
mate question as to whether that benefit will be able to outweigh
any adverse effects. 8 ' In this case, however, the Fifth Circuit has
determined that based on the existing record, the convenience to be
gained where the bank does not have agents at each facility is not
significant enough to constitute a public benefit.
3. COMPETITION
The competitive effect of approval of an application by a BHC
to sell insurance is the one factor that is listed in section 1843(c)(8)
as both a benefit, "increased competition," and an adverse effect,
"decreased or unfair competition." The emphasis is appropriate,
since it is in this area that the battle between the banking and the
insurance forces has become most heated.
The conflict in this area has focused on two separate argu-
ments. BHCs have argued that BHC sale of insurance will have a
pro-competitive effect by forcing independent agents to work harder
to compete with the BHC subsidiaries. The agents dispute this, and
in addition, charge that sale of insurance by BHC subsidiaries will
result in "voluntary tying" of the insurance sale to the credit trans-
action, giving the BHC subsidiary an unfair competitive edge.
The initial BHC argument appears deceptively simple. An in-
crease in entrants into a market is generally viewed as the opposite
of monopolization and is naturally associated with increased compe-
tition. However, the insurance industry forces argue that the indus-
try is already highly competitive. They note that the top four under-
280. The question of how much convenience results will be relevant to the following
conclusions. See Part VII.B. infra.
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writers control only twenty percent of total sales, and the top ten
control only thirty-three percent. There are 4,700 underwriting com-
panies, ' and approximately 75,000 agencies" 2 already established
and competing.
The BHC response is that despite'the number of direct writers
and independent agents, the industry is inefficient and not competi-
tive. The most complete explanation of the BHC position is found
in Lenders Acting as Insurance Agents: Public Policy
Considerations, by Carter H. Golembe Associates, Inc. (Go-
lembe).283
Golembe notes that since insurance premium rates are set by
regulating agencies responding to proposals by underwriters, the
role agents may play in controlling prices is limited." 4 Golembe also
presents statistics which demonstrate that the unique insurance
agency business experiences reverse economies of scale.28 In other
words, as agency size increases, costs consume a larger percentage
of each premium dollar instead of a smaller percentage. Thus, vol-
ume does not generate cost savings which could be passed on to the
consumer. Nevertheless, Golembe argues that the agents do have
some ability to influence prices, but that agents have used their
influence to raise, not lower, prices.
Golembe proposes that since agents' commissions are one cost
of underwriting insurance reflected in premium prices, agents could
lower premiums by: (1) urging the underwriters to lower their com-
mission rates; or (2) choosing companies which offer lower pre-
miums due to lower commissions. Instead, Golembe maintains that
agents avoid these lower priced, lower commission policies and that
high volume agencies use their bargaining power to negotiate
higher, not lower commissions.286
The agents respond that it is the BHCs, not the insurance
agents, who have displayed an inclination to place their own finan-
cial gain ahead of the public interest. They point to the experience
of BHC sale of credit life, health and accident insurance in Florida.
BHC rates for such insurance became so high that the Insurance
Commission intervened and imposed a price ceiling of seventy-five
cents per $100 of 'coverage. Despite the fact that the insurance was
available from insurance agencies in the state for as little as thirty-
eight cents per $100, after the Commissioner's action almost all
281. IIAA, supra note 134, at 2-3.
282., Id. at 6.
283. Golembe, suprd note 134.
284. Id. at 30.
285. Id. at 28-30.
286. Id. at 30.
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banks were selling the insurance at the maximum.287 In addition,
some banks were allegedly avoiding the maximum by accepting
interest free deposits by underwriters. Other abuses, not related to
prices, have also been alleged."8
Golembe offers statistics demonstrating that the cost to under-
writers of using the American agency system is higher than the cost
of direct writing. The implication is that the agencies are ineffi-
cient."' In response to charges of inefficiency, agents argue that the
consumer who purchases from an independent agent has chosen to
pay slightly higher rates in return for personal services of the agent,
which include advice on how much insurance to carry, which com-
pany to purchase it from, and assistance in handling claims.
Golembe suggests, however, that the agent's advice may be
motivated by factors other than the customer's best interests. Go-
lembe alleges that agents carry virtually identical policies at differ-
ent prices, using the lower priced policy on price-conscious consum-
ers and pushing similar but price-inflated policies when the con-
sumer is less likely to be a "shopper."9 " Golembe also reveals that
some underwriters offer higher commissions once a certain volume
is reached.29" ' The point is that while agents argue that their personal
service involves choosing the best policy for the individual cus-
tomer, the agent may in fact yield to the obvious conflict of interest
and choose a policy which will result in. the highest commission to
the agent.
Golembe further maintains that since independent agents own
their renewals, they "live off renewals" and do not actively seek new
accounts.9 Statistics are presented which indicate that direct
writer agents spend more time selling and do sell more new poli-
cies. 9 ' Theoretically, BHC competition would force independent
agents to be more aggressive. The independent; agents logically an-
swer that they spend more time servicing existing accounts, particu-
larly in handling claims.
One final point made by Golembe is that the independent
agents have been experiencing a loss of market share to the direct
writers. 94 This, like their higher rates, suggests that the indepen-
dent agents are inefficient and cannot compete successfully. The
287. IIAA, supra note 134, at 19-20.
288. Id. at 20-23.
289. Id. at 31.
290. Golembe, supra note 134, at 31.
291. Id. at 32.
292. Id. at 36.
293. Id. at 53.
294. Id. at 25, 47.
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agents' answer is that the price competition of direct writers has
resulted in a shift in the focus of sales by independent agents. In the
uncomplicated personal lines, service is less a factor, and, therefore,
direct writers have been able to capture a steadily increasing share
of this market. The independent agents have responded by focusing
on the more complicated areas of insurance where service is impor-
tant to the consumer. Thus, the statistics represent not so much an
across-the-board loss in market share as a division of the insurance
market, with the independent agents taking the smaller, service-
oriented kinds of insurance and the direct writers capturing the
kinds more susceptible to less personal volume treatment."
9  .
As might well be expected, the parties also disagree on the
effect BHC sale of insurance will have on the small independent
agents. The insurance industry insists that BHC insurance subsidi-
aries will drive small agents out of business. In their petition for
rehearing the insurance groups cited the administrative law judge's
conclusion that "it is possible, even probable, that the mom and pop
agency will be driven into merger or out of business entirely", and
"the independent commission agents would have difficulty surviv-
ing."' Golembe, on the other hand, argues that BHCs are unlikely
to capture such a significant market share as to drive out substan-
tial numbers of agents, and if the agents are driven out because they
cannot compete with more efficient insurance distribution systems,
the public will benefit nonetheless. Golembe's last point is well
taken. It makes no economic sense to protect the agents if their
downfall is a result of their inefficiency. However, this Darwinian
approach to economics is only valid in the absence of the existence
of unfair competitive factors, and as will be discussed hereafter,97
there is a serious question as to whether unfair voluntary tying,
rather than inefficiency, would be responsible for forcing the small
agencies out of business.
In considering these various arguments it is easy to lose sight
of the fact that whether there is a net public benefit is the real issue.
It may be maintained that additional entrants into a market, even
if they do add "competition," do not by virtue of that fact alone
create a public benefit. The public only benefits if the added compe-
tition has one of the following effects: greater convenience, lower
prices, or better service. Since convenience is considered as a factor
separately, it should not be included here under competitive effect.
295. IIAA, supra note 134, at 11.
296. Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehearing In Banc (sic) at
10 n.8.
297. See notes 306-26 infra and immediately preceding and accompanying text.
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The Board found in Southern"' and First National"' that no more
than a "minimum amount" of price competition would result. The
Fifth Circuit found that there would be "some pressure for lower
prices. 300 Applicants indicated no intention to undercut the agents.
Therefore, the belief apparently is that to offset the competitive
advantage that the BHC has due to the convenience of its one-stop
shopping service, the agents will have to employ what limited influ-
ence over prices that they have to lower prices. The suggestion that
agencies could be operated profitably if commissions were lower has
not been substantiated. Even if it is possible, the fact that in the
face of undisguised price competition from direct writers the agents
have failed to lower their rates hardly supports the notion that they
would suddenly take that approach in response to similar competi-
tion from BHC subsidiaries. At best, it is speculation to predict
lower prices. It is difficult to see how such speculation constitutes
"substantial evidence" that there would be a reduction in prices as
a result of BHC entry into the market.
Both the administrative law judge and the Board, as well as the
Alabama court, agreed that increased competition on the basis of
service would result. While on its face this seems perfectly logical,
the question left unanswered is just what service the agents are now
supposed to offer. If there are additional services to provide or a way
to better provide existing services, the fact remains that the agents
have not done so already to compete more effectively with the direct
writers.
It may be argued that since a large portion of the market shares
taken over by the direct writers has been in insurance lines requiring
the least service, the agents have not had to give the best service to
keep the service-oriented market share. However, the direct writers
do offer the service-oriented insurance and have taken some of that
market, suggesting that the agents have, in fact, kept that market
by striving to give the best possible service. Thus, the question
arises as to what "substantial evidence" leads to the conclusion that
it can be "reasonably expected" that agents will be able and willing
to increase service. It should be noted that the Board is authorized
to speculate on adverse effects, since it may weigh "possible adverse
effects,"3 ' but benefits must be "reasonably expected. '302
298. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,551 (1974).
299. First Nat'l Holding Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 33,411, 33,413 (1974).
300. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 249 (5th Cir. 1976).
301. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970) (emphasis added).
302. !d. (emphasis added).
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The Board and the court also found that there would be added
competition as a result of the financial expertise of thg loan offi-
cers2.03 IIAA alleges that there was no evidence in the record to
indicate how this expertise would be helpful in ensuring that the
borrowers have the proper insurance coverage, and no evidence to
suggest that borrowers were not currently getting the proper pack-
age. 4
It must be remembered that the burden of presenting substan-
tial evidence-showing that the public can reasonably be expected
to benefit-is on the applicant BHC. 3"1 The BHC arguments here
are speculative, and the counter-arguments of the insurance indus-
try seem at least as plausible. The conclusion that BHC entry into
the insurance agency business is likely to yield any price reduction
or increased service appears highly questionable.
In addition to disputing the competitive effects of BHC sale of
insurance, the insurance industry alleges that the BHCs will have
an unfair competitive advantage as a result of "voluntary tying."
IIAA distinguishes voluntary tying from coercive tying as follows:
Coercive tying results from specific attempts of the lender to use
its power over credit (the tying product) to coerce the borrower
to purchase insurance (the tied product). Voluntary tying, on the
other hand, results '. . . from a customer's realization that he
stands a better chance of securing a scarce and important com-
modity (such as credit) by 'volunteering' to accept other products
or services rather than seeking them in the competitive mar-
ket.'3
IIAA further points out that the line of demarcation between the two
is often blurred since subtle suggestions by the loan officer may not
be an outright insistence upon purchase of insurance as a condition
to credit approvals, but may create a pressure to purchase the insur-
ance that induces a response that is not totally voluntary.
Coercive tying is prohibited by section 106 of the BHCA, as
amended.'"' However, the statutory prohibition is impotent in pre-
venting voluntary tying, which is a psychological phenomenon
which can occur in the mind of the borrower without any suggestion
by the loan officer at all. The mere knowledge that the bank also
303. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 249 (5th Cir. 1976); First Nat'l Holding Corp., 39 Fed. Reg. 33,411, 33,413 (1974);
Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,551 (1974).
304. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 79-80.
305. Worcester Bancorp, Inc., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 393, 394 (1974).
306. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 82-83.
307. See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
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sells insurance may be sufficient to generate the belief in a bor-
rower's mind that purchase of insurance will enhance his chances
of credit approval. The argument of the insurance agents is that the
competition from the BHC subsidiaries will not be based on service
or price. Essentially, they argue that inherent in BHC sale of insur-
ance, even without any overt action by the bank employee, there
exists a voluntary tying effect which gives a BHC insurance subsidi-
ary an unfair competitive edge against which the insurance agencies
cannot compete. The alleged result is that even if independent
agents were to offer better services and/or lower prices, the consum-
ers would succumb to the psychological pressure of voluntary tying.
Potentially, the public could end up with more expensive insurance
or less service, while thousands of independent agents, who may be
more efficient, lose business.
It should be noted that voluntary tying is not a concept origi-
nated by the IIAA in Alabama. As the IIAA brief points out, con-
cerns over voluntary tying have been voiced by Congress,"8 the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice," 9 and even the Federal
Reserve Board staff.310
It should further be noted that the belief of consumers that
purchasing insurance from the lending institution will aid the
chances of credit approval is not totally unfounded. In evaluating
credit, the bank does a risk-reward analysis similar to that done in
any well thought out investment. The bank weighs the potential
earnings (interest) against the risk of loss (default). The additional
insurance premium income may raise the reward side of the ratio
high enough to justify a risk that the interest income alone may not
justify.3 1' IIAA points to testimony by one bank official in the hear-
ings on First National's application suggesting that where the appli-
cant purchased bank insurance, the bank might be "more recep-
tive" to approving the loan.3'2 Even clearer evidence of at least one
bank's inclusion of insurance premium income in its credit evalua-
308. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 87, citing H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1970).
309. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 87.
310. Id. at 88, citing Hearings on Consumer Credit Insurance Act of 1969 Before the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 163 (1969).
311. Absent usury laws, this situation would not arise, since it would be simpler and
more efficient for the bank to charge an interest rate sufficient to create a risk-reward ratio
high enough to justify the loan. In effect, this use of a tie-in is a method of circumventing
usury regulation, and in economic terms is only an evil to the extent that the usury laws are
justifiable. For a discussion of use of tie-ins to evade price regulation, see Bowman, Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21-23 (1957).
312. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 84.
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tion is found in the following letter read into the record at recent
Senate hearings.
I regret very much the incident concerning "Mr. X". I based
my decision regarding this matter on what I thought to be the
interest of "Mr. X" and the bank. As I indicated to "Mr. X", our
bank could not accept the loan unless we were allowed to write
the credit life insurance. As I discussed by phone, the primary
reason for this request to write the insurance, was because this
action increased the return of income on the loan by a good mar-
gin. Had our bank been denied this additional income, we could
not have approved the loan. Because of the extremely tight credit
situation, I feel "Mr. X" would not have obtained the loan else-
where. Therefore, I believed our bank to be doing "Mr. X" a
service by granting this type of loan under these circumstances,
with credit as tight as it is at present.
I can still appreciate and understand your reasoning and
regret that "Mr. X" saw fit to cancel his policy with your com-
pany. I am hopeful this situation will not occur again in the
future.
13
Golembe suggests a number of answers to charges that tie-ins
will occur. Some of the arguments raised are apparently directed at
coercive tying and do not apply to voluntary tying. For instance,
Golembe argues that even subtle pressure would offend bank cus-
tomers and drive them to competitors; but voluntary tying may
occur without any pressure whatsoever. Golembe further suggests
that consumers are now "much more alert to credit alternatives and
much more aggressive with respect to abusive business behavior.""
It is argued that the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z31' help
the consumer to be aware of the price he is paying for insurance in
order to make comparisons. If the comparisons are unfavorable, the
consumer has other bank and nonbank credit alternatives.
The arguments based on consumer awareness and credit alter-
natives to a large extent ignore the nature of the credit transaction.
In other consumer settings, the consumer's focus is on purchasing a
specific product (goods or services) at the best available price. The
price of that product is one of his primary concerns. In the credit
transaction, the consumer's main focus is on obtaining the credit,
His concentration on the relatively large figures involved in the loan
itself, may severely diminish his sensitivity to the relatively small
313. Competition in Banking Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2721 Before the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1976) (letter offered by Mr.
Schmuck, appearing on behalf of various insurance industry members).
314. Golembe, supra note 134, at 38.
315. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
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differences between insurance rates. Furthermore, while most con-
sumer purchases require only a decision by the consumer to buy, the
"purchase" of credit also requires the decision by the lender to
consent to the credit extension.A'6 Depending upon the credit stand-
ing of the consumer, this approval may be a source of great concern
to the consumer, further distracting his focus from the price of the
insurance. Young borrowers without credit experience who are at-
tempting to establish a credit standing may feel that approval of the
loan is paramount. Even if the borrower is aware that there are
alternative sources of insurance offering better service or lower cost,
he may consciously decide that if the purchase of bank insurance
may improve his chances of loan approval, the sacrifice is worth-
while.
Furthermore, the availability of alternative credit sources does
not offer quite the same flexibility to the consumer as does competi-
tion in other industries. Often consumers seek credit from banks
where they have savings and checking accounts and utilize other
services. A consumer may logically feel that his best chance for
credit approval is from a bank with whom he has an established
relationship. He may succumb to the voluntary tying influence at
his regular bank to help his chances of credit approval there, fearing
that if that bank would not grant the credit, others with whom he
has no relationship would be even less likely to extend credit. In
addition, obtaining credit from a different source forces the con-
sumer to choose between the inconvenience of dealing with two
institutions and the inconvenience of switching all of his other bank-
ing services to the second bank. While these arguments are highly
speculative, they are no more speculative than Golembe's sugges-
tion that consumer awareness will prevent voluntary tying.
In addition, it has been argued that if insurance is not discussed
until after the credit is approved then there can be no tying effect.
The theory is that since the approval has been made, the customer
knows that the insurance purchase is not needed to improve the
chance of obtaining the loan. However, this may not totally elimi-
nate tying. Most customers have continuing relationships with their
banks. The customer may feel that by buying the insurance else-
where he will create a less favorable atmosphere if there is a problem
meeting loan payments and he has to negotiate for an extension.
Also, he may feel that failure to purchase the insurance may make
him a less desirable customer to the bank and affect a future loan,
316. The element of "seller approval" is a function of the usury laws which prevent the
bank from charging an interest ratio high enough to justify credit approval.
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particularly in a tight credit market where he may be competing for
the same loan dollars with a bank customer whose past record indi-
cates to the bank that a loan to that customer will also generate
insurance premium income.
One final suggestion has been that voluntary tying may be
eliminated by totally separating the credit and insurance transac-
tions. Aside from the fact that this eliminates a substantial portion
of the convenience and efficiency of bank sale of insurance, the
consumer may still feel that there is communication between the
bank departments and that the insurance purchase may still aid his
loan approval.
In his findings in the Southern application, the administrative
law judge concluded that voluntary tying was a possible adverse
result of bank sale of insurance 7.31 However, the Board found that
no unfair competition would occur because: (1) there were no spe-
cific instances of tying in the record; (2) insurance was generally not
discussed until after a loan had been closed; (3) penetration figures
for a bank-related insurance agency in North Carolina indicated
that a very low percentage of sales of insurance relative to total
loans was obtained by that agency; and (4) there are nonbank credit
sources available in the applicant's market area.38 The Board fur-
ther stated that "[iut is clear from this evidence of record that
Applicant does not possess that degree of market power sufficient
to create the danger of voluntary tying ... "1
Although not in any way binding upon the Board, market power
over the tying product (as in this case, the credit) has been held to
be an essential element in proving the existence of a tying arrange-
ment that violates the anti-trust laws.32 The market power require-
ment is based on the reasoning that if the seller of a product does
not possess market power over the tying product, the buyer will
simply purchase the tying as well as the tied product elsewhere.32 ,
However, price regulation, such as usury laws, creates a form of
market power that does permit a seller to benefit from a tying ar-
rangement.2 2 Furthermore, if voluntary tying were only the feeling
that not purchasing insurance would hurt chances of credit ap-
proval, then borrowers might consciously avoid banks that sold in-
surance. Then market power would be a relevant factor because
317. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,551 (1974).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 25,552.
320. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
321. Bowman, supra note 311, at 20.
322. Id. at 21-23.
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alternatives might be limited. But voluntary tying is just as much
a positive feeling that purchasing the insurance may help the
chances of credit approval. Thus, borrowers may seek out banks
which sell insurance in the hope that by purchasing the insurance
the borrower may be able to offer the bank an added incentive to
approve the credit request. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit con-
firmed the Board's conclusions.323 Interestingly, the court described
the Board's role as one of determining the "reasonable likelihood"
of adverse effects," whereas the statute calls for balancing
"possible" adverse effects.32
The Board concluded that no voluntary tying existed due to the
lack of market power. While there may be disputes among econo-
mists as to whether such voluntary tying should be considered anti-
competitive, particularly if the banks prove to be more efficient
producers, the Board, by examining whether or not it existed, argua-
bly implies that it views voluntary tying to be an anti-competitive
effect. The burden of proving that there would be no adverse effects
is on the applicant. The only concrete evidence in the record was
the penetration rates of two insurance agency subsidiaries. One
dealt only with mortgage lending, and the other was apparently in
a community of under 5,000 population, since the subsidiary sold
general insurance .3  Other than this scant empirical evidence, the
conclusions of the administrative law judge, the Board, and the
Fifth Circuit have been speculation.
Whether voluntary tying is a real danger does not seem to be a
matter that would evade empirical evaluation. Testing consumer
attitudes by survey has become a sophisticated art used frequently
in the marketing of products. It should not be difficult to design a
survey to determine whether a consumer would feel that purchase
of the insurance sold by the BHC would enhance chances of loan
approval. Such a survey might also demonstrate whether certain
factors, such as not discussing insurance until after loan approval,
would reduce the consumer's belief that the insurance sale was a
factor in loan approval. The findings might well be that irrespective
of the specific circumstances in a given application, a certain
amount of voluntary tying could be expected as inherent in bank
sale of insurance. This would not necessarily mean that all applica-
323. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 249-51 (5th Cir. 1976).
324. Id. at 250.
325. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
326. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 250 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tions would fail the public benefits tests. What it would mean is
that, in every BHC application to sell insurance, it would be as-
sumed that there was inherent in such sales a certain level of ad-
verse effects (due to voluntary tying) which would have to be out-
weighed by benefits. In other words, a threshold amount of public
benefits would have to be demonstrated in order to gain approval
to sell insurance. There would then be no more instances where the
Board finds no adverse effects and therefore grants approval based
on any, even de minimis, public benefits.
The question of the existence and degree of voluntary tying in
these transactions goes to the heart of whether or not flI-IC gale of
insurance complies with the Congressional goals under the BHCA.
The outcome may result in the reallocation of millions of dollars of
insurance premiums to less efficient providers of insurance. The
result would be that substantial numbers of independent agents
may be forced out of business, while consumers incur increased
insurance costs. At the very least, it would seem that the Board
should require the applicants to meet their burden of proving that
voluntary tying would not occur. Ideally, however, one might sug-
gest that the Board, as protector of the public interest, take upon
itself to commission a study by competent experts to ensure an
impartial gathering of data which would allow the Board to make
an educated, empirical determination, instead of one based on spec-
ulation and guesswork by Board members who have no qualifica-
tions for evaluating psychological pressures which may influence
decisions of the credit consumer.
4. EFFICIENCY
BHCs have argued, and the Board has agreed, that BHCs can
market insurance more efficiently than can independent agents.
Golembe argues that the agents live off renewals and have not taken
advantage of direct billing services offered by the underwriters. He
further points to the saving that results from not taking the same
information from the borrower twice and from avoiding appraisal
and inspection of collateral by both bank and insurance company.
Additional efficiencies are allegedly to be found in use of the BHCs'
data processing facilities and personnel and management re-
sources.3V
IIAA counters that: (1) when the insurance and credit transac-
tions are separated to avoid tying, the efficiencies are lost as proce-
dures are then duplicated; (2) that, as the Golembe publication
327. Golembe, supra note 129, at 52-55.
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itself demonstrates, 328 agencies do not experience economies of scale;
and (3) that accounting services, which BHC data processing could
take over, account for only one percent of agency expenses.32 9
In First National, the administrative law judge found gains in
efficiency "doubtful" since the BHC subsidiary did not plan to use
direct billing.330 The Board disagreed without mentioning the
judge's reasoning, finding efficiencies in reduced advertising and
solicitation expenses and in the combining of the insurance and
credit operations.33' While the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Board's
findings, it criticized the Board for not considering possible sources
of inefficiency to determine if there were net gains. For this reason,
the court refused to uphold the Board's conclusion.332 The most
interesting of the court's comments, however, is found hidden in a
footnote. The court states that increased efficiency is a public bene-
fit even if no improved service or lower prices result, because "a
public benefit in a broad sense is conferred whenever a service is
performed in a new way which requires less of society's limited
human and economic resources. ' '33 One might question, in light of
the unemployment rates in recent years, whether conserving our
"limited human resources" is really a public benefit. Essentially the
court has held that if a bank can make more profit selling insurance
than an agency can, the public benefits. While there may be support
for such an argument in the capitalist economic theory, a question
certainly may be raised as to whether this is what Congress envi-
sioned when it required the Board to look for public benefits. If the
BHC subsidiary can market insurance at lower cost, it seems incon-
sistent with the intent of the public benefits test not to require that
the banks pass on those savings to demonstrate a public benefit.
Indeed, in approving applications to underwrite credit life, health
and accident insurance under 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10), the Board
has specifically required projections of either lower rates or in-
creased policy benefits. 33' A similar requirement for approval of
BHC insurance agency activities would be proof of BHC efficiency
claims and would end the speculation regarding efficiency as a bene-
fit by showing a concrete savings to the public.
328. Id. at 27-30.
329. IIAA, supra note 134, at 29-32.
330. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 75.
331. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,551 (1974).
332. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1976).
333. Id. at 248 n.21.
334. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10)(n.8) (1977).
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5. UNDUE CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND
UNSOUND BANKING PRACTICES
The remaining three factors will be dispensed with briefly be-
cause they have not been the subject of major controversy. As the
Fifth Circuit has pointed out, undue concentration of resources
blends into competitive effects, and the meaning of "undue" is un-
clear. 335 IIAA argued in Alabama that undue concentration would
result from approval because, based on projected volume, the BHC
agency would be a very large agency. Although the administrative
law judge found that both applications would result in a concentra-
tion of resources that would pose a threat to independent agents,336
both the Board and the court concluded that this adverse effect
was not present.337 Next to the income and assets of a large BHC,
the income and assets of even a larger insurance agency is not an
addition that makes a sizable increase in the BHC's resources.
Agency size seems to go more to competitive effects than concen-
tration of resources. A merger of a BHC and a large underwriter
with investment assets might be more the kind of transaction con-
templated under "undue concentration of resources."
A "conflict of interest" adverse effect was argued by the IIAA,
which suggested that the bank and the borrower might have differ-
ent "interests" in the collateral being insured. 38 How this would
result in a real conflict is not clear. Both the independent agent and
the bank would have an incentive to see that the borrower was at
least adequately insured in order to generate the highest premiums,
and both have the same incentive not to offend a customer by push-
ing insurance he does not need. The only real conflict of interest is
the incentive to sell unneeded insurance, and both independent
agents and BHC subsidiaries must deal with that equally.
Finally, the issue of unsound banking practices is not even
argued by the IIAA. While insurance premiums might induce the
bank to make a loan it would not otherwise make, presumably this
is a result of a risk/reward analysis which would balance out over
time, since theoretically the higher risk of default would be covered
by the added income. The Board concluded that regulatory supervi-
sion of loans would prevent banks from making unsound loans to
335. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 251 (5th Cir. 1976).
336. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 93-94.
337. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 251 (5th Cir. 1976).
338. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 94-95.
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earn insurance premiums. 39 The Fifth Circuit did not address the
issue.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A Proposed Conceptual Modification
Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Burns has referred to
the closely related and public benefits tests as two separate and
distinct tests.3 0 This conceptual dichotomy seems to have been gen-
erally accepted without question; however, both the statutory lan-
guage and the above discussion of the closely related test suggest
that scrutiny of this two-test concept might well be in order.
The statutory language calls for the Board to determine if activ-
ities are "so closely related to banking . . . as to be a proper inci-
dent thereto. 3' In deciding if an activity is a proper incident, the
Board is to consider whether "benefits" which "outweigh possible
adverse effects" "can reasonably be expected.3 4 If an activity is
closely related when it is a proper incident, and is a proper incident
if it yields a net benefit, then it is closely related if it yields a net
benefit. Rather than suggesting two tests, the language seems to
define the kind and degree of relatioNship necessary to satisfy the
"closely" component in "closely related." The relationship must be
one that can reasonably be expected to yield a net benefit to the
public.
In the general discussion above of the closely related to banking
test, it became painfully obvious that if there is a closely related test
per se, neither Congress, the administrative law judge, the Board,
nor the Fifth Circuit appears to be able to agree on what it is.
Various attempts to explain it include: "direct and significant
connection, ' 3 3 "functional equivalent to an extension of credit, ' '3
''organizationally and physically integrated into the operations of
the bank holding company, 345 "credit related," ' "directly related
to an extension of credit," 4 ' "close functional relationship,1
3
339. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,552 (1974).
340. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
342. Id.
343. H.R. REP. No. 91-1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
344. IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 60.
345. Alabama Financial Group, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 25,548, 25,549 n.3 (1974).
346. Board Brief, supra note 179, at 25.
347. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
348. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, BANK COUNSEL 1976, at 120 (1976) (Corporate Law and
Practice Handbook Series No. 220, H. Mortimer, Chairman).
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"operational integration . . . into the bank lending process,"349
"naturally . . . depend upon" or "appertain to,"350 "so integrally
related . . . as to require . . . provision in a specialized form, '35'
"contribut[ing] to the operations of those subsidiaries actually
engaged in the banking business. ' 35 2 An activity has been deemed
closely related if the bank has a legitimate need for it, or it supports
the credit transaction in a significant way. 353 An activity has also
been deemed closely related to banking where it is "incidental to"
and "necessary for the effectuation of" another closely related activ-
ity. 354 Furthermore, the above discussion noted language which
seems to transform the closely related test into a "rational incident
to banking" test,355 or a "regular mutual need" test.3 1
After carefully reviewing all of these attempted definitions or
paraphrasings, it is still virtually impossible to delineate guidelines
that assist in predicting whether a given activity is or is not closely
related to banking. One is left with the conclusion drawn early in
the discussion of the closely related test that closely related is sim-
ply what the Board says it is, unless the appellate courts decide
arbitrarily to substitute their definition for the Board's.
While the closely related language is nebulous, indefinable and
unpredictable, the public benefits test is workable, allows reasona-
ble predictability, and is thoroughly consistent with concepts of
government regulation in a capitalist society. In a capitalist econ-
omy based upon free competition, business should be free of govern-
ment regulation unless there is reason to believe that regulation is
in the public interest. Because of the potential adverse results of
permitting banks to engage in nonbank activities through holding
company subsidiaries, regulation has been determined to be in
order.357 If the basic premise underlying regulation is that permit-
ting these nonbank activities may in some cases result in harm to
the public, the logical goal of the regulation should be to permit
those activities that will yield a net benefit to the public, and forbid
those activities which will yield a net injury to the public. In other
349. Salley, What is Closely Related to Banking?, 56 MONTHLY REVIEW, FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 98 (June 1971), cited in IIAA Brief, supra note 168, at 50.
350. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1015 (1957).
351. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
352. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agent v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 241 (5th Cir. 1976).
353. Id. at 244.
354. Id. at 245.
355. See notes 205-07 supra and accompanying text.
356. See notes 207-08 supra and accompanying text.
357. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
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words, a public benefits test alone is the purest, simplest way for
the Board to make decisions that would be totally consistent with
the reasoning behind the regulation.
Apparently an assumption was made by those drafting the orig-
inal closely related language that if an activity had a close relation-
ship to banking, then BHC participation in that activity is less
likely to have adverse effects and more likely to yield benefits. This
assumption is not without logical foundation. The more related to
banking an activity is, the more likely bank management and em-
ployees will be able to use their expertise to perform the activity
efficiently, and the less likely it would be to distract bank manage-
ment from their banking responsibilities. If the bank can perform
the service efficiently, the public is likely to benefit from quality
service or lower prices. However, the fact that activities which are
closely related are more likely to yield a net benefit does not mean
that only closely related activities will yield a benefit. For instance,
the Fifth Circuit found that certain convenience insurance author-
ized by Regulation Y was not closely related.3 s Yet some of these
types of convenience insurance, as the Board has found, do yield a
public benefit. If the purpose of regulation is to protect the public
interest by allowing activities which will result in a net benefit,
there appears to be something wrong with a test designed to imple-
ment that policy if activities that do yield a public benefit fail the
test.
The legislative history, the administrative law judge's hearings,
Board orders and appellate court decisions reveal that attempts to
treat the closely related language as a test have deteriorated into a
confusing and meaningless semantic legerdemain that is inconsis-
tent with the most basic purpose underlying regulation.
The addition of the public benefits language in 1970 should be
viewed not as the addition of a second test, but rather as a clarifica-
tion of the meaningless closely related test. If there is a net benefit
to be derived from allowing a BHC to engage in a certain activity,
by definition that activity should be considered a "proper incident"
to banking. Regulation Y can still stand, but not as a list of activi-
ties that the Board has arbitrarily, without statutory guidelines,
defined as closely related to banking. Rather, Regulation Y should
be, as it now partially is, simply a list of those activities which pass
a "generalized public benefits" test, that is, are likely to pass the
public benefits test. Regulation Y could then provide a useful guide-
358. Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1976).
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line for applicants by defining activities involving circumstances
which often result in net public benefits, but it would not preclude
approval of activities not on the list if a net benefit could be demon-
strated.
Adoption of this approach by the Board would end the wasteful
semantic debate over the term "closely related" and would leave the
Board with a test that is relatively clear and totally consistent with
the theory behind regulation.
B. Public Benefits: A More Intensive Analytical Approach
Whether the Board adopts the suggestion to drop the dysfunc-
tional "closely related" test as a separate test or not, there is room
for major improvement in the Board's treatment of the public bene-
fits test as applied to insurance applications.
First, voluntary tying either exists or does not exist. Voluntary
tying is a psychological phenomenon that occurs, if at all, in the
mind of the consumer. Whether or not it exists is not the kind of
finding of fact that an administrative law judge, the Board, or the
courts are competent to make without expert assistance. At the very
least the applicants, in order to meet their burdens of showing a net
public benefit, should be required to demonstrate with proper em-
pirical evidence, such as a study conducted by persons with the
proper psychology and consumer economics background, that vol-
untary tying does not occur. Ideally, however, the Board should
commission its own study in order to ensure impartiality, since the
lack of pure adversary proceedings makes it inappropriate to rely
upon the intervening party to criticize such a study. If the study
shows that voluntary tying is inherent in these credit related insur-
ance transactions, the Board should attempt to evaluate the sever-
ity of this adverse effect. The resultant amount of adverse effect
inherent in such transactions would create a threshold level of ad-
verse effect which would have to be exceeded by benefits.
Furthemore, the Board should re-evaluate the allegations con-
cerning the convenience factor in order to make some judgment as
to how significant any increased convenience may be. The Board
might view the convenience both in terms of the effect on an indi-
vidual consumer and in terms of the aggregate national time sav-
ings. Only by making a judgment as to the degree of increased
convenience that may be expected can the Board weigh this conven-
ience against the adverse effects.
A third factor deserving reconsideration is increased efficiency.
The position taken by both the Board and the Fifth Circuit is that
increased efficiency is a public benefit regardless of whether the
savings are passed on to the consumer. Even if there is theoretical
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economic support for such a position, it is questionable whether
Congress had in mind such sophisticated economic footwork when
it listed increased efficiency as a "public" benefit. It seems much
more likely that Congress would have viewed the consumer as the
"public," and would have intended that the efficiencies be passed
on. If BHC subsidiaries can indeed operate more efficiently, it seems
only logical to require them to meet their burden of proof and dem-
onstrate their efficiency. They can do this by passing cost savings
on to the consumer so as to yield a benefit that consumers can
experience, instead of one that can only be read about in economics
texts. The Board insists that permission to underwrite insurance
depends heavily on demonstrating lower costs to the public.359 There
is no reason not to impose a similar requirement on permission to
engage in agency activities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the controversy over sale of insurance by BHC
subsidiaries suggests that two broad revisions are in order. First, the
dysfunctional closely related test should be abandoned. Second, the
Board should halt the guesswork and properly determine to what
degree, if any, voluntary tying occurs; it should reconsider its con-
clusion that a meaningful increase in convenience is achieved by
BHC subsidiary sale of insurance; and where increased efficiency is
alleged, the BHC should be required to demonstrate such efficiency
by proving that the consumer will receive either increased services
or lower prices. If these suggestions are adopted the Board will be
in a better position to perform its task of employing its regulatory
authority to promote the public interest.
359. See note 334 supra and accompanying text.
19781
